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Enforcing / Protection:
The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases
Maureen A. Sweeney *
Law School Associate Professor
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
[Abstract]
United States immigration courts that decide asylum cases are situated within the Justice
Department—a law enforcement agency deeply invested in enforcing border control—and
are subordinate to the Attorney General, the nation’s politically appointed chief law
enforcement officer. This institutional subjugation of immigration judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals challenges the system’s integrity and leaves people seeking protection
promised by international treaty to the whims of a politically responsive enforcement agency.
Courts exacerbate the problem when they give Chevron deference to those Justice
Department decisions rather than reviewing them rigorously. Given the prosecutorial
nature of the Justice Department, the obligatory and international nature of the legal duty
to protect asylum seekers, and the vulnerable population at risk, courts should reconsider
the appropriateness of giving deference to the prosecuting agency on asylum decisions and
standards. This would be in keeping with developing Chevron jurisprudence, in which
the Supreme Court has shown increasing willingness, in Step-Zero-style analysis, to ask
whether Congress truly intended for courts to extend deference to a specific agency on a
specific statutory question, and with case law declining deference to prosecutors.
This article will apply contemporary Chevron doctrine to the question of deference in
asylum and withholding of removal cases arising under the Refugee Convention. It will
conclude that Congress likely intended for courts not to defer to, but rather to exercise
robust review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the Attorney General, to
ensure full enforcement of all immigration law—including asylum provisions that protect
persecuted individuals.
I.

Introduction

Law School Associate Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. The author is grateful for the thoughtful support and input of the many people—too
many to name but each appreciated—who commented on and improved this article as it
developed, including participants in the Immigration Law Scholars and Teachers Workshop,
the Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop, the Junior Faculty Exchange at the University
of North Carolina, and so many of my colleagues at Maryland Carey Law. Shi Yang, Virginia
Giannini, Bennett Procter, Stephanie Trader, Katherine Martinez, Paola Vibriesca, Gregory
Miles, and Susan McCarty provided excellent research and citation assistance.
*
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Thousands of men, women and children apply for asylum and withholding of removal in
United States immigration courts each year, seeking to hold the nation to its obligation under
international law to provide protection to those fleeing persecution. 1 The courts where they
seek this protection are administrative tribunals located within the Department of Justice
under the authority of the Attorney General. This institutional position of subordination to
a law enforcement agency—and to its highly placed and politically sensitive executive
officer—has long been a challenge to the integrity of the immigration court system. It is
particularly troublesome in a political atmosphere in which an administration may have an
interest in denying asylum in favor of the highly politicized goal of protecting borders. The
appointment of Jeff Sessions, an Attorney General who is openly hostile to asylum
applications, highlights the danger this structure can pose to individual protection, 2 but the
threat is in fact institutional and not personal to any one Attorney General or specific to any
one administration. As an agency with a primary mandate for and deep investment in
immigration enforcement, the Justice Department is simply not a neutral institutional home
for adjudication of high-stakes asylum applications by vulnerable individuals. The president
of the National Association of Immigration Judges describes the problem:
The apparent conflicts of interest have time and time again proven to be
actual conflicts of interest between protecting the integrity of the court and
the independence of the Immigration Judges from infringement by the
perspectives and positions of a law enforcement agency. 3

See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The U.S. became bound to the terms of the Convention
when it signed on to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967). As of December 2016, the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) had 223,433 pending affirmative
asylum applications. Asylum Office Workload, USCIS ASYLUM DIVISION (Dec. 2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20E
ngagements/PED_2016_12AsylumStats.pdf. The Executive Office for Immigration
Review, which administers the Immigration Courts, reported that it received 65,218 asylum
applications in FY 16. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICS, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK (Mar. 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download.
2
See infra Part II; News Release, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to the
Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, VA (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarksexecutive-office-immigration-review [hereinafter Sessions Remarks to EOIR].
3
Letter from A. Ashley Tabaddor, Pres., Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges to Elizabeth
Stevens, Fed. Bar Ass’n, Immigration Law Section (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.naijusa.org/images/uploads/publications/NAIJ_endorses_FBA_Article_I_proposal_3-1518.pdf (endorsing the FBA’s proposed legislation in support of an independent Immigration
Court).
1
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This “inherently problematic” conflict of interest is one reason that the NAIJ advocates for
Congress to create a new, truly independent immigration court system under its Article I
authority, 4 a position supported by the American Bar Association, the Federal Bar
Association, and an increasing number of other organizations, jurists, and legislators. 5
In the absence of such a fundamental restructuring, however, federal courts make quiet
decisions every day about whether to apply a presumption of deference, under Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 6 to Justice Department decisions on
individual applications for asylum and withholding of removal and on the standards for
granting those applications. In the context of refugee protection, the Chevron question
dictates the rigor with which courts review published Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or
Board) and Attorney General decisions interpreting the provisions defining eligibility for
protection. This question of deference can mean the difference between lifesaving
protection and deportation back to danger.
Consider a potential asylum applicant. 7 “Ruben” became homeless at the age of eleven when
he left his abusive and neglectful father’s house, having lost his mother several years earlier.
He was taken in by members of a powerful criminal gang that controlled his neighborhood
and whose members protected him and provided him food, shelter and a sense of belonging,
but who also gradually began demanding that he participate in their activities. He left the
gang at age fourteen because his conscience did not allow him to join in the escalating
violence the gang leadership demanded of him. Shortly after making this decision of
conscience, he fled the country when he was “green-lighted” with a death sentence for
having defied gang leaders. At the age of sixteen, he now applies for protection in the
United States.
Id.
See, e.g., Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Border Security and Immigration, of the S. Judiciary Comm. 115th Cong. (Apr. 18,
2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/04-18-18-bass-testimony (statement of
ABA Pres. Hilarie Bass); Letter from Kip T. Bollin, Pres. Fed. Bar Ass’n & Elizabeth
Stevens, Chair Immigration Law Section of Fed. Bar Ass’n, to Sen. John Cornyn & Sen.
Richard Durbin (Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/GovernmentRelations/Letter-from-FBA-President-Kip-T-Bollin-.aspx (in support of proposed
Immigration Court Act for the Subcommittee Hearing of Apr. 18, 2018); AM. IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASS’N (AILA) BOARD OF GOVERNORS, RESOLUTION ON IMMIGRATION COURT
REFORM (Winter 2018), https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/74919. See
also Immigration Court Improvement Act of 2018, S. 2693, 115th Cong. (2018) (a bill to
safeguard the judicial integrity and independence of immigration judges).
6
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that where Congress has left
a policy question ambiguous, courts should generally defer to the decisions of an executive
agency charged with administering a statutory scheme. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that the EPA’s interpretation of a “stationary source” of pollution was due deference by the
courts and, as a reasonable interpretation, was not judicially reviewable.
7
This hypothetical case is fictional but includes details that are representative of actual cases.
4
5
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While there is no dispute that Ruben’s life is in danger, 8 an applicant for asylum or
withholding has the burden to show that he has been targeted on account of one of the
limited number of reasons that give rise to protection under U.S. asylum law (race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group). 9 This limited list of
reasons comes from the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, on which
Congress based U.S. asylum law. 10 Relevant to Ruben, the BIA has issued a series of
decisions interpreting and defining the elements of the statutory phrase, “particular social
group.” The Board held in 2014 in Matter of W-G-R- that an individual targeted for harm for
having defected from a criminal gang will not qualify for asylum or withholding because he
cannot be considered a member of a “particular social group” as Congress intended that
legal definition to be understood. 11
As it turns out, that the answer to the deference question has serious consequences for
Ruben, because it can significantly limit the rigor with which the federal courts will review
the Board’s interpretation, with life-and-death consequences. Prior to the W-G-R- decision,
Ruben’s chances of winning asylum differed significantly depending on whether the circuit
court with jurisdiction over his location had decided to give Chevron deference to earlier
Board interpretations finding that defecting gang members could not qualify for asylum.
The four circuit courts that had considered whether former gang members could constitute a
“particular social group” had reached two opposite results on the basis of four different lines
of reasoning regarding agency deference. 12 In the wake of W-G-R-, federal circuit courts of
See, e.g., Oscar Martinez, The Gang Informant El Salvador Failed to Protect, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan.
16, 2015), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/the-gang-informant-el-salvadorfailed-to-protect/; Oscar Martinez, The Death Foretold of an El Salvador Gang Informant,
INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 19, 2015), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/ms13-ganginformant-killed-el-salvador/.
9
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2010); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012).
10
Refugee Convention, supra note 1. As discussed, infra, Congress incorporated the terms of
the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees into the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) through the Refugee Act of 1980 with the express purpose of
bringing the United States into compliance with its obligations under the Convention and
the 1967 Protocol. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1525 (2012). See also INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987) (finding that Congress intended the Refugee Act
to bring the U.S. into compliance with the Refugee Convention).
11
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158. See also W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014) (explaining that WG-R- and companion case M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014), changed the
standard the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) uses to evaluate particular social groups
and concluding that former gang members did not constitute a cognizable particular social
group).
12
Compare Cantarero v. Holder, 734 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2013) (deferring under Chevron and
holding the BIA correctly rejected former gang members as a particular social group), with
Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir. 2014) (declining to defer to the BIA’s
unpublished, nonprecedential decision below and holding that the BIA erred in holding that
8
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appeals are faced with the question of whether or not to defer to the Board’s conclusion
about former gang members as a possible protected group and, more generally, to the
standard the Board established in W-G-R- and its companion case for evaluating cognizable
particular social groups. 13 Thus, the likelihood that our potential applicant will have a viable
claim to protection flows rather directly from the courts’ decisions about whether or not to
apply Chevron deference to the Board’s interpretation of the phrase.
The Supreme Court has indicated—but decades ago and without substantive analysis under
contemporary Chevron jurisprudence—that the BIA should get Chevron deference in asylum
and withholding cases. Just three years after Chevron was decided, in 1987, the Court stated
in dictum in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 14 that Chevron deference would apply in the interpretation
of the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA’s) asylum and withholding provisions, and
courts have since then repeated that assertion without much analysis. 15 However, in the
three decades since that statement, courts have struggled in a wide variety of cases with how
to apply Chevron, and the doctrine has evolved considerably. 16 The case law has developed
former gang membership was not an immutable characteristic of a particular social group),
and, Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding the BIA “erred as a matter
of law” in misconstruing the petitioner’s social group and holding that he was a member of a
cognizable particular social group of former gang members), and Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d
426 (7th Cir. 2009) (not discussing deference but not deferring to the BIA’s unpublished
decision below and recognizing social group of former gang members under Circuit law).
All of these circuit court decisions were issued prior to W-G-R- and could be susceptible to
an argument under Brand X that the subsequent agency decision should override the earlier
court holdings. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005) (holding that a prior court’s construction of a statute that differs from an agency
construction is only entitled to Chevron deference if the prior court decision holds its
construction came from an unambiguous term of the statute).
13
See, e.g., S.E.R.L. v. Attorney General United States of America, 894 F.3d 535, 555 (3rd Cir.
2018) (deferring under Chevron to the BIA’s standard for particular social group as
established in W-G-R- and companion case, M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014));
Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions, 881
F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2018) (applying standard established in W-G-R- and companion case);
Garay Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1133-37 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing and concluding
that BIA’s standard for particular social group determinations under W-G-R- is due Chevron
deference).
14
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
15
Id. at 446; see infra Section IV.
16
See e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1156 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (noting “practical problems of administration”); see also Peter M. Shane &
Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron After Thirty Years: Continued Uncertainty About Scope
and Application, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (2014) (introducing the proceedings of the 2014
symposium, “Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward,” including papers by a
dozen different scholars with a wide range of views on the justifications, explanations, scope
and even validity of the doctrine).
5
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nuance as to whether, when, how and why deference should or should not be applied to the
decisions of a particular executive agency in a particular instance. From the same CardozaFonseca decision in 1987—which highlighted the limits imposed by the statutory language
and expressed intent of Congress—to King v. Burwell 17 in 2015 and other recent cases, the
Supreme Court has considered various aspects of both the nature of the executive agency
and the nature of the question at issue to decide whether it was likely that Congress intended
to delegate a question to a particular agency and whether courts should apply Chevron’s
presumption of deference to the agency interpretation. 18 The doctrine has evolved from a
seemingly straightforward directive of deference to the articulation of a preliminary “Step
One” analysis of congressional intent as revealed through statutory construction and, later,
the addition of several varieties of an even more preliminary “Step Zero” consideration of
whether to apply the doctrine at all. 19
Despite the significance and complexity of this evolving doctrine, however, the Court has
never returned to substantively consider whether it is appropriate to grant deference to the
Justice Department in the context of the provisions of the Refugee Act. To the contrary,
Cardoza-Fonseca set the case law trajectory early, before more nuanced questions were being
asked about Chevron’s reach. In the decades since, courts have applied Chevron deference to
asylum and withholding law (as they have to immigration law generally) without any
particularized analysis of the unique institutional context of the Justice Department as a
prosecutor or the origin of refugee protection as a product of international obligations.
This article will do what the courts have never done—it will apply contemporary Chevron
doctrine to the question of deference to the BIA and the Attorney General in asylum and
withholding of removal cases arising under the Refugee Convention. I will consider the
appropriateness of deference in light of both the nature of the agency involved and the
nature of the interpretive questions raised. I will look at statutory construction principles
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Id. at 2489 (holding that an agency’s level of involvement and expertise in a complex
subject matter and the political and economic significance of the question are relevant to the
deference due agency decisions); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,
2454 (2014) (“That sort of decision, which involved the Agency’s technical expertise and
administrative experience, is the kind of decision that Congress typically leaves to the
agencies to make”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 209–311 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (explaining the role of agency expertise and the question’s “distance from the
agency’s ordinary statutory duties” in evaluating deference); id. at 317 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“But before a court may grant such deference, it must on its own decide whether
Congress—the branch vested with lawmaking authority under the Constitution—has in fact
delegated to the agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity at issue.”). See infra Section
III.A.
19
See infra Section III.A. Individual judges and justices have also gone so far as to question
the wisdom of the doctrine in any context, including, most recently, a parting suggestion by
Justice Kennedy to his colleagues that it may be time to reevaluate Chevron as a general
matter. See also Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17
18
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arising from the international law roots of the INA’s asylum and withholding provisions, as
well as the fact that the Department of Justice is a law enforcement agency to which
deference may not be appropriate on questions of protection from enforcement. Finally, I
will consider whether the interpretation of international human rights instruments can be
considered a “policy” decision for which political accountability is either appropriate or
desirable. In the end, I will conclude that contemporary Chevron doctrine leads to the
conclusion that deference to the Board and to the Attorney General is not appropriate in
cases arising under the Refugee Act because of the institutional and legal particularities of
decision-making in this area of law. 20
Following this introduction (Part I), I will describe in Part II the institutional situation of the
immigration courts within the Department of Justice and the ways that political influence is
felt there. In Part III, I will briefly review the history and theoretical underpinnings of the
Chevron doctrine. In Part IV, I will review the way that courts have applied Chevron to
refugee protection cases. In Part V, I will provide a fresh look at the appropriateness of
deference to provisions that derive from the Refugee Act. I will first conduct a Chevron Step
Zero inquiry into the appropriateness of deference under recent Chevron case law, focusing
on the nature of the Department of Justice as an enforcement agency, the capacity of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, and the question of whether treaty-based humanitarian
protection obligations can be considered “policy” questions on which political accountability
is either appropriate or desirable. I will then move on to a Chevron Step One exercise of
statutory interpretation in light of the Charming Betsy canon for interpreting provisions that
implicate international law. Finally, in Part VI, I will conclude that a full understanding of
the “lawfulness” of immigration requires courts to exercise robust review of agency
decisions in asylum and withholding of removal cases, to enforce the commitments to
humanitarian protection in U.S. law.
II.

Protection and Power in a Politically Responsive Department of Justice

The Trump administration has made little effort to hide its antipathy for the asylum and
refugee system, seeing it as a loophole that complicates the task of sealing U.S. borders. 21
These arguments are not just a variation of immigration exceptionalism, rooted in the idea
that immigration should be treated differently than other regulated fields. For a discussion
on immigration exceptionalism, see David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (discussing examples of
immigration exceptionalism, such as Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INA, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001), where
the court upheld the provision of the INA that treated unmarried mothers and fathers
differently for the purpose of conferring citizenship); see also Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing
Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183 (2018). To the contrary, they reflect an application of generally
applicable developments in Chevron jurisprudence to the context of humanitarian protection
law under the INA and as implemented by federal immigration agencies.
21
In this, it has good company with governments around the world, where basic human
rights protections for refugees are colliding with strong claims to the executive power of
20
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The President issued an Executive Order within a week of his inauguration banning the
entry of all Syrian refugees and temporarily suspending all refugee admissions, among other
measures, for the purpose of “protect[ing] the American people from terrorist attacks by
foreign nationals admitted to the United States.” 22 Since then, he set the lowest-ever yearly
target for refugee admissions in 2018 (45,000), admitted less than half that small number in
fiscal year, and then slashed the limit for 2019 to two-thirds of the 2018 target (30,000). 23
On November 9, 2018, the Administration issued a Presidential Proclamation and a Joint
Interim Final Rule designed to bar asylum eligibility for anyone who enters the country from
the U.S.–Mexican border between ports of entry. 24 With regard to asylum seekers and

governments to exclude foreigners and secure borders. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 68.5 million people worldwide who have
been involuntarily displaced across international borders because of persecution, war or
other violence. Figures at a Glance, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (June 19,
2018), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html. At the same time, proposed
policies supporting restrictive immigration were and are a mainstay of Donald Trump’s
“America First” campaign, as well as the Brexit campaign for Britain to leave the European
Union and unexpectedly strong recent showings of nationalist parties in France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Austria, and Italy. See, e.g., Leigh Thomas, France’s Le Pen Says National Front
to be Overhauled after Election Defeat, REUTERS (May 7, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-lepen/frances-le-pen-says-nationalfront-to-be-overhauled-after-election-defeat-idUSKBN1830VK; Melissa Eddy, Alternative for
Germany: Who are They, and What do They Want?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/world/europe/germany-election-afd.html;
Giovanni Legorano & Marcus Walker, Italy Shakes Europe’s Establishment as Political Upstarts
Form Pact to Govern, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/italys-5-starleague-reach-deal-on-government-program-1526237962.
22
Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (“Protecting the Nation from
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”).
23
Letter from sixty-three Members of the House of Representatives to Kirstjen Nielson,
Sec’y of Homeland Security & Mike Pompeo, Sec’y of State (July 17, 2018),
https://greateras1.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FINAL_Refugee-AdmissionsLetter_signed.pdf (regarding the slow pace of Refugee admissions); Lesley Wroughton, U.S.
to sharply limit refugee flows to 30,000 in 2019, REUTERS (September 17, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pompeo/u-s-to-sharply-limit-refugeeflows-to-30000-in-2019-idUSKCN1LX2HS.
24
Presidential Proclamation Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of
the United States (November 9, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/presidential-proclamation-addressing-mass-migration-southern-border-unitedstates/; and Interim Final Rule, Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential
Proclamations; Procedures for Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018).
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others at the border, the President recently tweeted: “When someone comes in, we must
immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where they came.” 25
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, whose restrictionist immigration positions have been one of
the hallmarks of his long political career, 26 likewise made it his priority to rein in what he
describes as an asylum system “subject to rampant abuse and fraud,” being “gamed” by
“dirty immigration lawyers who are encouraging their otherwise unlawfully present clients to
make false claims of asylum providing them with the magic words needed to trigger the
credible fear process.” 27 Sessions repeatedly described a “crisis” of “lawlessness” at the
border and in the immigration system, even as he cites statistics indicating that 88% of those
entering illegally go on to establish a credible fear of persecution in their home countries and
the legal right to seek asylum. 28 His Justice Department implemented the administration’s
policy of “zero tolerance” criminal prosecution of all those who cross the border illegally,
predictably sweeping in that 88% who have come here seeking refuge. He also unilaterally
struck down a BIA decision that recognized domestic violence as possible grounds for
asylum, with sweeping language designed to preclude virtually all similar future claims, as
well as all those arising from persecution by gangs. 29

Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 10:02 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329. The Federal
Government has taken the position that tweets from the Twitter account
“@realDonaldTrump” are official presidential statements. See Innovation Law Lab et al. v.
Nielsen, No. 3:18-cv-01098-SI, Opinion and Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order
at 12, n. 3 (ECR No. 23) (D. Or. June 25, 2018) (citing James Madison Project v.
Department of Justice et al., No. 1:17-cv-00144, Def. Supp. Mem. at 4 (ECF No. 29)
(D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017) (“[T]he government is treating the President’s statements to which
plaintiffs point—whether by tweet, speech or interview—as official statements of the
President of the United States.”)).
26
See, e.g., ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUSTICE, STATEMENT TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE FOR HEARING ON THE NOMINATION OF JEFF SESSIONS U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL (Jan. 10, 2017), https://advancingjustice-aajc.org/publication/statement-senatejudiciary-committee-hearing-nomination-jeff-sessions-us-attorney.
27
Sessions Remarks to EOIR, supra note 2.
28
See, e.g., id.; News Release, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive
Office for Immigration Review Legal Training Program, Washington, DC (June 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executiveoffice-immigration-review-legal [hereinafter Sessions Remarks to Legal Training Program].
29
See A-B-, 27 I & N Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify
for asylum.”); see also id., at 320 n.1 (“Accordingly, few such claims would satisfy the legal
standard to determine whether an alien has a credible fear of persecution.”). Much of this
language is dictum, but the Attorney General’s intent to restrict asylum eligibility in the
courts and at the border is clear.
25
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Indeed, as the head of the Justice Department, the Attorney General has considerable power
to influence the immigration court system in a number of strikingly direct ways, from the
bureaucratic to the jurisprudential. The Immigration Courts and the BIA are institutionally
located within the Justice Department, and their judges and Board members are all
considered to be “agency attorneys representing the United States government” and serving
at the pleasure of the Attorney General. 30 As such, the Attorney General has the power to
hire, assign and fire judges and Board members at will. Regulations also give him the
authority to certify to himself and directly decide substantive questions of the interpretation
of immigration law, bypassing the existing court and appeal system and overturning its
decisions. 31 Former BIA Member Lory Rosenberg regards these twin powers as giving the
Attorney General “an exclusive level of authority over the course of immigration law and
policy.” 32
Attorney General Sessions used both of these powers aggressively in his twenty-one months
in office, 33 with the apparent goals of limiting both procedural rights and substantive legal
claims, especially in the asylum arena. 34 In a period of less than six months in early 2018, he
certified to himself and decided cases that (1) give ICE attorneys the unilateral power to
Dana Leigh Marks, Now Is the Time to Reform the Immigration Courts, INT’L AFF. F., Winter
2016, at 47, 50, http://www.ia-forum.org/Files/QNEMHW.pdf. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.10(a) (“The immigration judges are attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints . .
. .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (identifying Board Members as “the Attorney General’s
delegates”).
31
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its
decision all cases that: (i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him.”) The INA
also provides that the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all
questions of law [relating to immigration] shall be controlling”); 8 U.S.C. 1103(g).
Regulations also provide generally that the BIA shall be bound by decisions of the Attorney
General. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i).
32
See Lory Rosenberg, The Harm That Confirmation of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General Can Do to
Immigration Law and Due Process, LORY D. ROSENBERG ON APPEAL MATTERS (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://blogs.ilw.com/entry.php?9629-The-Harm-That-Confirmation-of-Jeff-Sessions-asAttorney-General-Can-Do-to-Immigration-Law-and-Due-Process.
33
While the Attorneys General under the Obama administration invoked this authority an
average of once every two years. See, e.g., Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 796 (A.G.
2016); Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015); Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (A.G.
2011); Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009)), Sessions certified four cases to himself in
the first three months of 2018.
34
Asylum, refugee status, and withholding of removal are all forms of humanitarian
protection under the INA that are rooted in the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of
Refugees. Many of their elements are drawn from the Convention and are therefore virtually
identical, including the definition of “refugee,” which applies to asylees and is related to the
eligibility criteria for withholding of removal. See infra, note 211. For simplicity, I sometimes
refer to “asylum” or “refugee protection” in this article; in many instances, those statements
will also apply to the other forms of humanitarian protection.
30
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keep a case from being administratively closed (to await adjudication of a petition, for
example, or for other reasons), (2) struck down a published BIA case that required a full
evidentiary hearing on every asylum claim, (3) overturned Matter of A-R-C-G-, 35 the BIA case
that recognized domestic violence as grounds for asylum in some circumstances, (4) drew
broad conclusions in that decision purporting to restrict asylum in circumstances where the
individual has been persecuted by a non-governmental actor (discussing specifically domestic
violence and gang-related claims), and (5) authorized summary pretermission of asylum
claims before a hearing. 36 The effect of these decisions is being felt throughout the system,
but most acutely at the border, where asylum seekers are being turned away at record rates
without so much as the chance to present a full asylum claim. 37
On the personnel side, the Sessions Justice Department has been accused of using political
considerations to shape the political leanings of the immigration bench. Despite a push to
increase the number of immigration judges hearing cases, the Department has been accused
of blocking or delaying the hiring of individuals provisionally offered immigration judge
positions near the end of the Obama administration. 38 At the same time, it has continued
the longstanding practice of hiring judges who come overwhelmingly from the ranks of ICE

A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 271 (A.G. 2018) (certified to the Attorney General on
Jan. 4, 2018, decided May 17, 2018); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (A.G. 2018)
(certified to the Attorney General and decided on March 5, 2018, without giving the parties
or amici the opportunity to brief any issues); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 325 (A.G. 2018)
(certified to the Attorney General on Mar. 7, 2018, decided June 11, 2018). See also Jeffrey S.
Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to Immigration Court?, JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG (June 24,
2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/are-summary-denials-coming-toimmigration-court.
37
Jeffrey S. Chase, Attorneys and Credible Fear Review, JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG (July 22, 2018),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/7/22/attorneys-and-credible-fear-review. See
also TRAC REPORTS, Findings of Credible Fear Plummet Amid Widely Disparate Outcomes
by Location and Judge, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/523/; USCIS POLICY
MEMORANDUM, PM-602-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE
FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- (July 11,
2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/201806-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf and Tal Kopan, Impact of
Sessions’ Asylum Move Already Felt at Border, CNN (July 14, 2018)
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/14/politics/sessions-asylum-impact-border/index.html.
38
See Letter from Representatives Elijah E. Cummings, Lloyd Doggett, Joaquin Castro, and
Donald S. Beyer, Jr. to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Apr. 17 2018),
https://cummings.house.gov/sites/cummings.house.gov/files/Dems%20to%20DOJ%20re.
%20EOIR%20Politicization.pdf; Tom Dart, Jeff Sessions Accused of Political Bias in Hiring
Immigration Judges, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/jun/16/jeff-sessions-political-bias-hiring-immigration-judges.
35
36
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and DOJ prosecutors. 39 In addition, the Department has tied challenging case completion
requirements to performance standards for immigration judges, raising the specter that
judges who spend more time hearing evidence and making findings to substantiate all the
elements of eligibility for complex cases like asylum will be sanctioned or even fired. 40
And Sessions was not subtle in reminding judges and Board members that they served at his
pleasure and were expected to implement his decisions. In his certified decisions, he
explicitly emphasized the “extraordinary and pervasive role” that the Attorney General has
over immigration matters as “virtually unique” and the power accorded him as “an
unfettered grant of authority” including “broad powers.” 41 On the same day that he issued
Matter of A-B-, 42 the controversial domestic violence decision, 43 Sessions gave a speech to

For example, of the twenty-three new Immigration Judges sworn in on August 15, 2018,
seventeen had served as prosecutors for ICE or the U.S. Attorney’s Office, an additional
three had worked for the DOJ or DHS, and only four had any significant professional
experience representing individuals in private or nonprofit law practice. IMMIGRATION
COURTSIDE, EOIR Announces 23 New Immigration Judge Appointments – Trend Of
Appointing Largely From Government Backgrounds Continues! (August 15, 2018),
http://immigrationcourtside.com/2018/08/16/eoir-announces-23-new-immigration-judgeappointments-trend-of-appointing-largely-from-government-backgrounds-continues/
40
Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN (Apr. 2,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html
(including a link to the EOIR PERFORMANCE PLAN, ADJUDICATIVE EMPLOYEES,
http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf). See also
Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ Policy Encourages Immigration Judges to Cut
Corners, BROOKINGS (June 18, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-on-the-border-newdoj-policy-encourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners/. Retired immigration judge
Robert Vinikoor points out that the quotas fail to take into account the varying complexity
of cases. Robert Vinikoor, Take it from a Former Judge: Quotas for Immigration Judges are a Bad
Idea, MINSKY, MCCORMICK & HALLAGAN BLOG (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.mmhpc.com/2018/04/take-it-from-a-former-judge-quotas-for-immigrationjudges-are-a-bad-idea/. For this reason, the apparently neutral administrative push to speed
up cases actually operates against asylum applicants whose cases require more time than
legally and factually simpler matters, and it is likely that judges sanctioned for low case
completion will be those who handle—and give sufficient attention to—significant numbers
of asylum cases.
41
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 323–24 (2018).
42
27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (2018).
43
Id. at 323-24 (overturning A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), which recognized
domestic violence as potential grounds for asylum). For a perspective on the controversial
nature of the decision in the opinion of certain retired immigration judges and BIA
Members, see Retired Immigration Judges and Former Members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals Statement in Response to Attorney General’s Decision in Matter of A-B-,
39
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employees of the immigration court system and pointedly reminded them of the chains of
command within the Department: “As the statute states, Immigration Judges conduct
designated proceedings ‘subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the
Attorney General shall prescribe’.” 44 Later in the same speech he reminded them that the
Department, in turn, should serve the administration’s goal of ending illegal immigration:
“All of us should agree that, by definition, we ought to have zero illegal immigration in this
country. Each of us is a part of the Executive Branch, and it is our duty to ‘take care that
the laws be faithfully executed’.” 45 The message to judges and Board Members appeared to
be the very message that Former Board Chair and Immigration Judge Paul Schmidt says they
get consistently from their superiors at the Justice Department: “You exist to implement the
power of the Attorney General, you aren’t ‘real’ independent Federal Judges.” 46
In fact, in 2018, Department administrators removed the judge assigned to a case that was
remanded in the wake of an Attorney General decision, when the judge failed to implement
the decision in precisely the way and with the speed that Department superiors expected.
The judge who was removed from the case and the NAIJ have filed a grievance against the
Executive Office for Immigration Review, complaining that the action violated, among other
things, the law requiring immigration judges to exercise their independent judgment. 47
With regard to humanitarian protection specifically, Attorney General Sessions unilaterally
set up both a legal framework and strong incentives for immigration judges to summarily
deny many asylum claims quickly and without a hearing. 48 Immigration courts around the
country are already issuing orders requiring respondents to submit briefs explaining why
their cases should not be summarily denied under the new decisions. 49 Matter of A-B-, the
domestic violence decision, is particularly concerning, as the case it overturned, Matter of AR-C-G-, had represented the considered result of fifteen years of agency adjudication—at the
immigration judge, BIA and Attorney General levels—that ended in a consensus that

JEFFREY S. CHASE BLOG (June 11, 2018),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/11/statement-in-response-to-matter-of-a-b-.
44
Sessions Remarks to Legal Training Program, supra note 28.
45
Id.
46
Former BIA Chairman Paul W. Schmidt on His Career, the Board, and the Purge (Part 1), THE
ASYLUMIST (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.asylumist.com/2016/09/28/former-bia-chairmanpaul-w-schmidt-on-his-career-the-board-and-the-purge-part-1/.
47
Ani Ucar, Jeff Sessions Wants To Remove Immigration Judges Who Aren’t Deporting People Fast
Enough, VICE NEWS (August 8, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/qvmeyd/jeffsessions-wants-to-remove-immigration-judges-who-arent-deporting-people-fast-enough.
48
See Chase, supra note 36.
49
See, e.g., Notice for All Asylum/Withholding/CAT Applicants, Immigration Judge Elise
Manuel, Newark, New Jersey Immigration Court; Notice for All Asylum/Withholding/CAT
Applicants, Immigration Judge Shifra Rubin, Newark, New Jersey Immigration Court;
Scheduling Order for A-B- Cases, [Respondent information redacted], June 20, 2018,
Arlington, Virginia Immigration Court (on file with the author).
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domestic violence claims could and should be recognized within the asylum framework. 50
And the politicized enforcement concerns that animated the decision are evident in its
repeated claims to broadly limit precisely the types of Central American claims the
administration has struggled to stem at the border 51—despite the fact that asylum claims
must be considered on a case by case basis, on their own facts and legal claims, and the fact
that domestic violence cases, of course, are not limited to Central American applicants. 52
The current president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, Judge Ashley
Tabaddor, has expressed concern at the Department’s efforts: “A lot of what they are doing
raises very serious concerns about the integrity of the system. Judges are supposed to be free
from these external pressures.” 53
As worrisome as Sessions’ actions were, however, he was not the first Attorney General to
wield the power of the office to further an administration’s political goals. 54 Under George
W. Bush, the Justice Department engaged in both politically biased hiring and changes (and
demotions) of existing personnel in a bid to shape the substance of immigration decisions.
Subsequent investigations by the Inspector General and the Office of Professional
Responsibility found that the Bush administration relied on improper political considerations
to hire immigration judges more likely to agree with the administration’s immigration
policies. 55 At the same time, Attorney General John Ashcroft conducted what has been
A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391–93 (B.I.A. 2014) (detailing history and noting DHS
stipulation on the cognizability of the particular social group).
51
See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (claiming broadly that domestic violence and gang-related
claims would generally not qualify for asylum); id. at 332 (complaining that A-R-C-G- had
been read broadly to encompass claims by “most Central American domestic violence
victims”). The treatment of gang-related claims (e.g., 27 I. & N. Dec. at 322-23, 339) was
particularly gratuitous, in that the facts of A-B- had no gang connection whatsoever.
52
See, e.g., In re: [redacted] (B.I.A. unpub. June 24, 2016) (recognizing a particular social group
under A-R-C-G- for a domestic violence victim from Ghana); In re: [redacted] (B.I.A. unpub.
Mar. 6, 2016) (remanding the case of a woman from the Dominican Republic for further
consideration under A-R-C-G-); In re: [redacted] (B.I.A. unpub. Sept. 21, 2017) (considering
but denying on factual grounds the claim of a woman from Hungary); In re: [redacted] (B.I.A.
unpub. Mar. 30, 2018) (recognizing under A-R-C-G- the particular social group of “minor
girls sold into marriage/sexual slavery in Cameroon”). These decisions are all on file with
the author.
53
Joel Rose, Sessions Pushes to Speed Up Immigration Courts, Deportations, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/29/597863489/sessions-want-to-overrulejudges-who-put-deportation-cases-on-hold.
54
See generally Catherine Y Kim, The President's Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1 (2018)
(discussing the history of presidential influence on agency decision making, including
political interference in adjudication generally and in the Trump administration).
55
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 137 (2008) (“The evidence showed that the most systematic use of
50
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described as a “purge” of more liberal-leaning, Clinton-appointed BIA members whose
views were disfavored by the incoming administration. 56 Studies have since shown that the
Ashcroft “reforms” resulted in making it considerably more difficult for asylum seekers to
prevail on appeal to the BIA. 57 They are also now generally agreed to have seriously
damaged both the quality of adjudication in individual cases and the reputation of the
agency. Subsequent case law developments at the Board and in the federal courts eventually
vindicated many of the legal positions taken by the purged members of the Board on such
issues as the recognition of gender-based forms of persecution as grounds for asylum and
the categorical analysis used to deport someone for a conviction. 58
political or ideological affiliations in screening candidates for career positions occurred in the
selection of IJs, who work in the Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR).”).
56
Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of Quasi Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications 15 (2004) (conference paper delivered at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association), reprinted in 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154 (Oct. 1,
2004). About a week after Attorney General Ashcroft arrived in office, then-BIA Chairman
Paul Schmidt was informed by the director of EOIR that the Department of Justice (DOJ)
leadership no longer wanted him as Chair, despite his distinguished record. In part to avoid
a fight that might damage the Board, Chairman Schmidt stepped down to the position of
Board member. Within two years, Attorney General Ashcroft implemented a
“reorganization” that eliminated five Board member positions; not coincidentally, the five
members who were cut were the more liberal members, including former Chairman
Schmidt, who was reassigned as an immigration judge. Lest there be any doubt as to the
motivation for the “reorganization,” former Chairman Schmidt reports that he was told at
the time that he was being cut because the DOJ leadership did not like the substance of his
decisions:
The reason I was cut is because they did not like my opinions—Ashcroft
apparently wanted a cowed, compliant Board where nobody would speak up
against Administration policies or legal positions that unfairly hurt migrants
or limited their due process.
Former BIA Chairman Paul W. Schmidt on His Career, the Board and the Purge (Part 2), THE
ASYLUMIST (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.asylumist.com/2016/10/05/former-bia-chairmanpaul-w-schmidt-on-his-career-the-board-and-the-purge-part-2/ [hereinafter Schmidt (Part 2)].
57
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV.
295, 359, 377 (2007) (documenting the “sudden and lasting decline in the rate of success by
asylum applicants” in the wake of the Ashcroft “reforms” (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP,
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE
MANAGEMENT 19–25 (2003),
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf)).
58
Schmidt (Part 2), supra note 56. See, e.g., A-R-C-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)
(finding that married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship
constitute a particular social group); Redacted, 2016 BIA LEXIS (B.I.A. Nov. 1, 2016)
(recognizing the proposed particular social group of Salvadoran women unable to leave a
domestic relationship as cognizable); R-A-,24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008) (granting asylum
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Beyond hiring and firing, the immigration courts have long been subject to a range of
politically motivated bureaucratic pressures within the Department of Justice. Judge Dana
Leigh Marks, former president of the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ),
gave the example of the upending of the system’s dockets in response to administration
enforcement priorities, which began under the Obama administration. 59 That administration
first prioritized the cases of Central American women and children asylum seekers following
the “surge” of entrants in 2014, in an attempt to deter future illegal entry. 60 But the move
served no positive purpose within the court system; to the contrary, it cast the system into
considerable chaos. 61
Attorneys General have also used their power to intervene and overturn BIA case law on a
number of important legal questions, including asylum claims based on domestic violence (in
this and previous administrations), coercive family planning policies, and female genital
mutilation; as well as the bars to eligibility for withholding of removal and the standard for
protection under the Convention Against Torture. 62 These decisions have often been
responsive to political imperatives within a presidential administration. For example,
Attorney General Michael Mukasey notoriously used this power in the waning days of the
George W. Bush administration in an attempt to overturn decades of BIA and federal court
case law in the Matter of Silva-Trevino 63 to broaden the range of convictions that would trigger
deportation as “crimes of moral turpitude.” 64 After eight years of chaos and inconsistent
rulings in the courts (often contingent on whether or not the controlling federal circuit court
to Guatemalan woman who fled severe domestic abuse); Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. 254 (2013) (affirming proper categorical analysis of convictions); Mathis v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (affirming proper categorical analysis of convictions); SilvaTrevino, 26 I & N Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016) (“Silva-Trevino III”) (confirming categorical
analysis of crimes involving moral turpitude analysis).
59
Marks, supra note 30, at 50.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (domestic violence); R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec.
906 (BIA 1999), vacated 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001), remanded 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G.
2005); remanded 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008) (domestic violence). J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
520 (A.G. 2008) (coercive family planning); A-T-, 24 I. & N. 296 (2007), vacated, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008), remanded to Immigration Judge, 25 I. & N. Dec. 4 (B.I.A. 2009)
(female genital mutilation); Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002) (drug trafficking offenses
as “particularly serious crimes”); J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006) (standard for
likelihood of torture upon return).
63
24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008); writ of habeas corpus denied, without prejudice, motion
granted by Silva-Trevino v. Watkins, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8423 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2009);
vacated by, petition granted by, remanded by Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 1947 (5th Cir. 2014); vacated and remanded by Cristobal Silva-Trevino, 26
I. & N. Dec. 550 (B.I.A. 2015); Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (BIA 2016).
64
Id.
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deferred to the Attorney General’s decision), the traditional analysis was vindicated and
reinstated. 65 But thousands of people were improperly deported during those years,
illustrating the very serious human consequences of giving the nation’s chief law
enforcement officer the power to unilaterally shape the interpretation of immigration law,
even if the courts can eventually restore a legally proper interpretation.
A presidential administration thus has considerable power to influence and even direct the
Justice Department’s interpretation of asylum law through the Attorney General and the
Board of Immigration Appeals, for political or other purposes. Successive administrations
have indeed taken advantage of that power. With this context, I will turn now to the
question of Chevron deference in this asylum context, beginning with a discussion of the
evolution of the Chevron doctrine itself, especially in recent years.
III.

Chevron: A Doctrine in Motion

In its 1984 Chevron decision, the Supreme Court both acknowledged and further enabled the
broad exercise of power by administrative agencies in the modern regulatory state. 66 The
case required the Court to consider the appropriateness of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA)’s implementation of a provision of the Clean Air Act allowing all pollution
emitting devices to be grouped into a single category. 67 Faced with this technical policy
question and with a lack of indication in the statute of how Congress intended to resolve it,
the Court institutionalized, for cases where Congress left ambiguous certain policy details for
the implementation of a statute, a flat preference for the decisions of politically accountable
executive agencies over reviewing courts. 68
The Court was concerned with incursions by the judiciary into policy questions about which
it had no particular expertise and for which it did not have any political accountability. The
Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826 (B.I.A. 2016) (“Silva-Trevino III”, holding that “the
categorical and modified categorical approaches provide the proper framework for
determining when a conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude.”).
66
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939 (2011), cited in Peter L. Strauss,
“Deference” Is Too Confusing-Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1149 (2012) (discussing the history of deference to agencies since the
controversies of the New Deal in response to “Congress’s increasing tendency to allocate
primary responsibility for implementing new statutory schemes away from the courts and
into administrative agencies.”); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (“Broad delegation to the Executive is the
hallmark of the modern administrative state”). See also Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise
and Fall of Chevron on the Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141,
146 (2012) (“Put simply, Chevron and its ensuing reformulation dramatically altered the
executive’s power to create and interpret law”).
67
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
68
Id. at 843–45.
65
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decision was framed in terms of separation of powers principles and established a hierarchy
of government authority for policy questions arising in the implementation of statutory
programs: legislative intent trumps executive implementation which in turn is given
deference over judicial interpretation. In the words of Michael Herz, “Properly understood
and sensibly applied, [Chevron] is a salutary recognition that Congress delegates broad
authority to agencies and courts must respect those delegations.” 69 Chevron was an
enormously important decision in the development of the administrative law principles that
govern our increasingly administrative state, 70 and a brief review of its history and theoretical
bases is helpful to understanding its texture and the nuances with which it has been
implemented.
A. The Evolution of the Chevron Doctrine
While the holding of Chevron can be stated relatively simply, its implementation has been
anything but straightforward. As administrative agencies have grown in size and power, the
Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled for thirty years to discern the proper limits
to deference and balance of power between the branches of government in agency decision
making. Courts at all levels have wrangled with how and where and to what extent to apply
this seemingly straightforward preference for executive policymaking, and scholars have
struggled to explain the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings. Indeed, Chevron seems to be
“both an untouchable doctrine and yet always under attack.” 71 What appeared at first blush
to be a sweeping and categorical preference for executive over judicial authority has
gradually been narrowed and qualified over the years, as courts have continued to identify
limits to the reach of the doctrine and have become concerned about disproportionate
power in executive agencies.
Within three years of his majority decision in Chevron, Justice Stevens clarified in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca that if a reviewing court could discern the intent of Congress on a question,
there was no need to even consider, much less defer to, the position of the agency: “If a
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1879
(2015).
70
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(recognizing Chevron as “an extremely important and frequently cited opinion, not only in
this Court but in the Court of Appeals” (citations omitted)). According to Westlaw, the
Chevron holding has been cited by 15,757 cases, indicating the increased importance of
administrative agencies.
71
Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2
(2017) (noting that a Westlaw search turned up 80,000 citations for Chevron); see also Michael
Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for
Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 978 n.5 (2008) (observing that
the volumes of commentary on Chevron testify to its importance as a doctrine, but also to its
complexity).
69
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effect.” 72 This became known as Chevron’s Step One. In 2001, in United States v. Mead Corp, 73
the Court held that an agency must have been authorized to and must have in fact spoken
“with the force of law” in order to trigger Chevron deference. 74 This was dubbed a
preliminary Step Zero. 75 Step Two is the court’s deferential review of agency action for
reasonableness, the standard as originally envisioned in Chevron.
In a series of cases in more recent years and with concern for “the growing power of the
administrative state,” 76 individual justices and Court majorities have raised other questions
about the reach of the doctrine and have increasingly been willing to recognize reasons to
decline to defer to executive agencies. The Court has been more and more willing to make a
robust initial inquiry (à la Step Zero) into whether Congress likely intended to delegate
authority to a particular agency on a specific question at issue. The Court continues to be
concerned about and to use Chevron’s language of balance of powers between the branches
of government, but as administrative agencies have grown in influence and power, the
concern has shifted from worry about a judiciary overstepping its bounds to fear of runaway
executive agencies in danger of trampling the other two Branches of government. As Chief
Justice Roberts expressed it, in dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC 77 in 2013: “[The Court’s]
duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our
duty to respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive.” 78
By 2014, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 79 a fractured Court rejected on substantive
grounds an EPA decision that expanded the agency’s own jurisdictional reach, in part
because the Court found it unreasonable (under Step Two) to believe that Congress would
have intended to delegate “decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance’” to the
agency without doing so explicitly. 80 And in 2015, in King v. Burwell, the Court sidestepped
the Chevron framework entirely on grounds that it was unlikely that Congress intended to
implicitly delegate a question of such “deep economic and political significance” under the
Affordable Care Act to the Internal Revenue Service, given that agency’s lack of expertise in

480 U.S. at 448 (quoting Chevron at 843 n.9).
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
74
Id. at 237 (2001) (holding that an agency letter binding only as the specific recipient of the
letter was not sufficiently authoritative agency action to warrant Chevron treatment).
75
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873
(2001). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
76
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Though
Justice Roberts was in the dissent in this case, his concerns shifted to the majority by 2015
when the Court dismissed Chevron concerns in King v. Burwell because of its doubt that
Congress intended to delegate important decisions under the Affordable Care Act to the
Internal Revenue Service. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–90 (2015).
77
569 U.S. 290 (2013).
78
Id. at 327 (2013) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
79
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
80
Id. at 2444 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
72
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health insurance policy. 81 In the same year, then-Judge Neil Gorsuch expressed a concern
about runaway executive agencies similar to that of a number of his future colleagues on the
Court: “When unchecked by independent courts exercising the job of declaring the law's
meaning, executives throughout history had sought to exploit ambiguous laws as license for
their own prerogative.” 82 More recently, he expressed concern that Chevron represents a
“violation of the separation of powers.” 83
This series of decisions reflects the Court’s growing skepticism of the central notion behind
Chevron deference—that where Congress does not say otherwise, it necessarily intends to
delegate the power to interpret an ambiguous statute to an executive agency rather than to
the courts. Indeed, even beyond the justices’ situational willingness to question that premise
demonstrated in this line of cases, the Court may soon be on the verge of overturning
Chevron altogether. In a parting suggestion to his colleagues in the 2018 case of Pereira v.
Sessions 84 (an immigration case in which the majority sidestepped Chevron by finding the
statute to be unambiguous), retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy opined that “it seems
necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie
Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.” 85 He noted with apparent
sympathy the calls in other cases from three of his conservative colleagues to reconsider
Chevron and pointed out the “troubling” tendency the doctrine encourages for reviewing
courts to apply “reflexive deference” and engage in nothing but the most cursory statutory
review. 86 He warned that the lackadaisical review of the lower courts in Pereira “suggests an
abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting federal statutes.” 87

135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“This is not a case for the IRS. It is instead our task to determine the
correct reading of Section 36B.”).
82
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 671–72 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc).
83
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
and citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); cf. City
of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 312–14 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (the author should include an
explanatory parenthetical).
84
138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).
85
Id. at 2121. See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, A Win for Immigrants and Cloud over Chevron at High
Court, LAW 360 (June 22, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1056048/a-win-forimmigrants-and-cloud-over-chevron-at-high-court.
86
Pereira v. Sessions 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (citing City of Arlington, 569
U.S. at 312–16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–14 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“For if we give the force of law to agency pronouncements on
matters of private conduct as to which Congress did not actually have an intent, we permit a
body other than Congress to perform a function that requires an exercise of the legislative
power.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d
1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
87
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018).
81
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Unless and until the Court takes that momentous step, however, courts at all levels will
continue to have to wrestle with when and to what degree to apply Chevron deference. While
the Supreme Court has found any number of ways to evade exercising Chevron deference, the
doctrine continues to be invoked frequently and to exert enormous power in the lower
federal courts. 88 And when those courts defer to BIA and Attorney General decisions in the
context of asylum and withholding applications, they do so with literally life-and-death
consequences for applicants.
B. The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Doctrine
In order to assess the appropriateness of deference in the context of humanitarian
protection, it is helpful to review the theoretical justifications for the doctrine. As the case
law has shifted over the years, scholars have struggled to nail down the theoretical bases for
Chevron doctrine. In the words of Peter Strauss, administrative law scholars have “leveled a
forest” since 1984 exploring and attempting to explain the theoretical underpinnings, the
justifications and the limits of the doctrine, 89 and more than thirty years later, the debate
continues in the courts and in the academy. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
address this forest of scholarship comprehensively, it is worth taking a moment to identify
the main rationales given for the doctrine, because they surface in contemporary questions
about its reach.
1.

Legislative delegation

Prior to Chevron, courts recognized and generally deferred to agency interpretations and rules
where Congress had explicitly delegated rulemaking authority to an agency. 90 The essential
move of the Chevron decision was to equate statutory “gaps” or ambiguities with those
In a recent study of 1561 cases in the federal circuit courts, Kent Barnett and Christopher
Walker found that the Chevron framework was applied to agency decisions 75% of the time in
the courts of appeals. Of those decisions subjected to Chevron analysis, the vast majority—
70%—made it to Step Two, where fully 94% of agency interpretations were upheld. Barnett
& Walker, supra note 71, at 31. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
977 (1992) (observing that Chevron’s two-step formulation transforms deference doctrine into
“a regime with an on/off switch”). Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s recent tendency to
avoid applying Chevron, the doctrine continues to be vitally important in the practice of
administrative law in the lower courts, where the vast majority of cases are resolved. As
Thomas Merrill put it, “for every case in which the [Supreme] Court confronts a Chevron
question, thousands are decided by the lower courts.” Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero after City
of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 783 (2014) [hereinafter Merrill, Step Zero].
89
Strauss, supra note 66, at 1144.
90
See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) (holding Congress had delegated an
administrative function to the agency for an efficient use of agency function and that the
“administrative conclusion [will be] left untouched”); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111
(1944) (holding that NLRB deserved deference because it exercised its delegated authority to
make a determination with reference to its statute reasonably).
88
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explicit legislative delegations of authority and to extend to agency interpretations filling
those gaps the deference that had traditionally been given to exercises of explicitly delegated
authority. 91 This concept of implied legislative delegation to the agency was articulated
prominently by the Court in the Chevron decision itself and was the principal traditional
theoretical justification for Chevron’s preference for agency decision-making: If Congress is
the primary legislative body, deference should be given to any body to which Congress has
delegated that legislative authority, whether explicitly or implicitly. 92 Professor Strauss
describes “Chevron space” as a “consequence of delegation” 93 and as:
the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act
in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is, its delegated or
allocated authority. The whole idea of “agency” is that the agent has a certain
authority, a zone of responsibility legislatively conferred upon it. 94
Much of the early force of the Chevron doctrine rested in the separation of powers argument
that deference to the delegated authority of the agency was indirectly deference to the
principal law-making function of Congress.
However, this stated basis for the Court’s decision has been roundly criticized and debunked
as a legal fiction with no basis in legislative reality. 95 Justice Scalia opined early on that gaps

Merrill & Hickman, supra note 75, at 834.
Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (explaining that Chevron deference “is premised
on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to
the agency to fill in the statutory gaps” but ultimately holding that Congress did not intend
such a delegation in that case).
93
Strauss, supra note 66, at 1164.
94
Id. at 1145.
95
Herz, supra note 69, at 1876 (“[I]t is hard to find anyone who does not consider
congressional delegation a fiction”) (citing, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 212–25 (concluding Chevron does not rest on
actual congressional intent)); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional
Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011) (“The framework for judicial review of agency
statutory interpretation rests on a legal fiction: Congress intends to delegate interpretive
authority to federal agencies whenever it fails to resolve clearly the meaning of statutory
language.”); Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 613 (2014) (“[I]n contrast to most of the other
interpretive rules, there is widespread agreement about Chevron’s source: the Court created
the doctrine.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise,
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 749 (2002) (“Chevron deference
revolves around the fiction of a congressional delegation . . . .”); Scalia, supra note 66, at 517
(noting “any rule [regarding congressional allocation of interpretive authority] represents
merely a fictional, presumed intent”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power
91
92
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in statutory frameworks in the vast majority of cases likely did not indicate any congressional
intent whatsoever but rather that Congress “didn’t think about the matter at all,” 96 and thenJudge Neil Gorsuch dismissed implied legislative delegation in a 2016 concurring opinion as
“no more than a fiction—and one that requires a pretty hefty suspension of disbelief at
that.” 97 Indeed, Abbe Gluck argues persuasively that the modern trend toward
“unorthodox” lawmaking and large, extremely complex and “messy” statutes 98 makes it
increasingly likely both that such inadvertent gaps will result and that they will reflect no
intention at all on the part of Congress to delegate anything. 99 Even the Chevron decision
itself recognizes that Congress’s failure to speak on a particular detail might have been
“inadvertent.” 100
As criticism of the fiction of delegation mounted, reliance on it as the justification for
Chevron deference correspondingly dwindled. But it has not disappeared by any means.
Many of the recent cases eschewing deference have done so with the explanation that, for
one reason or another, it was unlikely that Congress intended to make such a delegation to a
particular agency in the specific context at issue. 101
2. Agency Expertise
Another justification offered for agency deference is that the agency, because of its focus,
has expertise in the subject matter at hand. The Chevron court, faced with a technical
question of the relative merits of different approaches to controlling industrial air pollution,
acknowledged that a full understanding of the policy implications of the question “depended

to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589–91 (2006) (describing proposition that
Congress has delegated authority to executive as “fiction.”)).
96
Scalia, supra note 66, at 517 (describing implied congressional delegation as “a fictional,
presumed intent”). See also Merrill, Step Zero, supra note 88, at 759 (“Even Chevron’s most
enthusiastic champions admit that the idea of an ‘implied delegation’ is a fiction.”).
97
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F3d 1142, 1153 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
98
Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 76, 110 (2015).
99
Id. at 96 (“One way to understand all of this is to view the Court’s sidestepping of Chevron
[in King v. Burwell] as actually a new doctrinal move: namely, that not every ambiguity in an
imperfect and complicated statute creates interpretive space for the agency.”).
100
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (referring to “the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency”).
101
See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (explaining that the Chevron framework “is
premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps”; however, in some cases, “there may be
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress intended such an implicit delegation.”);
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014).
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upon more than ordinary knowledge” 102 and that the justices were “not experts in the
field.” 103 In light of its lack of expertise, the Court found it preferable to leave the policy
question for the agency to answer. The Court subsequently described “practical agency
expertise” as “one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.” 104 The Court
has waffled nonetheless in how it has described the sort of expertise that should justify
deference. Does expertise refer to a technical or scientific expertise in the field of regulation
as it did in Chevron? 105 To “the way the real world works” in the implementation of the
statute? 106 Or to the complicated workings of a statutory scheme? 107 The Court has not
resolved this question, and, perhaps correspondingly, it and lower courts have varied in the
weight they have given to agency expertise in deference decisions. One study revealed that
courts granted the most substantial deference in cases arising in the technically complicated
areas of environmental science, energy regulation, intellectual property, pension regulation,
and bankruptcy. 108
It also appears that courts have varied in the levels of deference they have been willing to
give different agencies according to their perceptions of the general levels of expertise,
capacity and oversight in those agencies. As noted, agency claims of technical or scientific
expertise are, understandably, I think, most likely to be given deference. 109 On the other
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Id. at 865.
104
Paul Chaffin, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA
Interpretations of the INA, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 525 n.102 (2013) (citing Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990)). Justice Scalia, in turn, stated
his position that while agency expertise may be a practical benefit of Chevron deference, it was
not theoretically sufficient to justify it. Scalia, supra note 66, at 514.
105
See, e.g., Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In the face of
conflicting evidence at the frontiers of science, courts’ deference to expert determinations
should be at its greatest.”); Carstens v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 742 F.2d 1546, 1557
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[P]etitioners fundamentally misperceive the judiciary’s role in complex
regulatory matters. The uncertainty of the science of earthquake prediction only serves to
emphasize the limitations of judicial review and the need for greater deference to
policymaking entities.”); Am. Coke & Coal Chems. Inst. v. EPA, 452 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (upholding an EPA rule that revised nationwide limitations on certain water pollutant
discharges and EPA authority to assume industry effluent limitations). For a general
discussion of extreme judicial deference to legislative science, see Emily Hammond Meazell,
Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial Review of Legislative Science, 84 IND. L.J. 239
(2009).
106
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651 (1990).
107
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56–57 (2014).
108
Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 S.
CT. REV. 1, 29 (2013) (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1173–74 (2008)).
109
Id.
102
103
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hand, courts have proven less willing to cede to claims of agency expertise where they
perceive problems of bias or dysfunction in an agency. 110 For example, a comparative study
of the effects of Chevron on administrative law decisions found that while the doctrine
generally increased deference to agencies, it seemed to make courts no more willing to defer
to decisions by the legacy Immigration and Nationality Service, 111 a difference one
commentator attributed to “judicial knowledge of the dysfunctionality of that particular
agency.” 112 Likewise, one way to understand the Supreme Court’s rejection of the Chevron
framework in King v. Burwell is as a rejection of the IRS as an expert in the field of health
insurance regulation that was the main subject of the Affordable Care Act. The Court
responded to but did not dwell on the reality that complex statutory schemes now often
implicate different federal agencies to different degrees and may involve them in peripheral
ways in fields in which they are not truly expert.
And finally, some commentators have questioned whether being immersed in the day-to-day
implementation of a statutory scheme necessarily makes an agency a better decision-maker
than a court, regardless of specialized knowledge. Some have argued that agencies can
develop “tunnel vision,” causing them to act without sufficient regard for larger normative
frameworks such as the Constitution. 113 Others argue that agencies that work regularly with
certain interested parties or industries can become “captured” by those special interests and
lose their regulatory independence. 114
Such concerns for agency independence, capacity and expertise have led some Supreme
Court justices and some scholars to argue for a completely new regime that would condition
levels of judicial deference on “the type of agency, the agency’s track record, the agency’s
expertise, the level of presidential and congressional control over the agency, and the timing
of the agency’s action.” 115

Id. (citing Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency’s Success in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 5 FIU L. REV. 437, 451 (2010)).
111
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1043.
112
Pildes, supra note 108, at 29 n.84.
113
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 108, at 1174–75.
114
Pildes, supra note 108, at 21 (discussing the rise of agency capture theory); see also Richard
B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1804
(1975); DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE:
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (2013).
115
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 980 (2008); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001) (advocating different levels of deference
depending on which executive voice speaks and/or whether the agency is executive or
independent); F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 546–47 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (calling for increased supervision of executive agencies because of “[the] agency’s
comparative freedom from the ballot-box control.”).
110
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3. Policy question for which political accountability is desirable
“Chevron imagines the agency as a policymaker, appropriately responsive to the political
views of the President in office at any given time.” 116 The Chevron Court described the
subject of the contested decision-making at issue in that case as “policy-making” and as
“assessing the wisdom of [ ] policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing
views of the public interest.” 117 The Court held that this function of formulating “policy”
was most properly left to the political branches, which could ultimately be held accountable
by their constituents for these normative choices: “[F]ederal judges—who have no
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.” 118
If an agency has authority and capacity to engage in policy-making, the next question is what
constitutes a question of “policy” on which its action should receive deference. Chevron’s
first step narrows this inquiry by excluding questions found to require only statutory
interpretation because any policy decisions already made by Congress should simply be
implemented. From there, the doctrine originally seemed to presume that any remaining
ambiguity would be resolved by having the agency weigh the relative merits of substantive
policy alternatives and choose among them based on their normative value in light of the
public interest. However, over time, it became clear that the line between legal
interpretation and substantive policy decisions could be fuzzy. Some of the implementation
work of agencies turned out to be more akin to interpreting statutory language than filling in
substantive policy gaps. Many courts and commentators began to describe this generally as
the “interpretive authority” given to agencies over the statutes they administer and to debate
whether such “law-like” interpretive activities were deserving of as much deference as more
substantive policy choices. 119 Michael Herz has attempted to clarify the difference,
distinguishing between two possible meanings of the word “construction” as applied to a
statute: (1) construing (interpreting) statutory language and (2) “constructing” policy, that is,
“making a normative, policy-based, prescriptive decision” 120 “in the space Congress left for
Strauss, supra note 66, at 1146–47.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
118
Id. at 866.
119
Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S.
Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 806 (1997); Herz, supra note 69, at 1883; see also City of
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the agency
interpretive authority as existing only when Congress has conferred authority to the agency).
120
Herz, supra note 69, at 1883 (citing Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN.
L. REV. 673, 684–708 (2007) (making extended argument that treating agency
implementation of statutes as being “statutory interpretation” is both incorrect and
harmful)); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking under
Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 196–200 (1992) (arguing Chevron deference applies to
agency policymaking but not agency “interpretation” in sense of determining what it is
Congress has done); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They
Administer: A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 200 (2007) (“Step two
116
117
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the agency to work within.” 121 Courts have not always been consistent in distinguishing
these types of activity or in deciding whether they are equally worthy of deference, often
deferring under Chevron to agency interpretation of statutory language that does not appear
to implicate traditional notions of policy-making.
In sum, on this somewhat shifting set of theoretical justifications and even with a Supreme
Court that may be backing away from the doctrine in whole or in part, Chevron continues to
hold enormous sway in the lower courts and remains vitally relevant to the analysis of
asylum and withholding cases, as the next section explores.
IV.

Chevron Deference to the Justice Department in Asylum and Withholding Cases

As noted, the Supreme Court and lower courts have stated repeatedly but without much
analysis that the Chevron framework applies to asylum and withholding of removal law (as it
does to immigration law generally), but they have never engaged in a robust analysis that
takes into account the unique features of Refugee Act provisions, and they have not
examined the question in recent years in light of the nuances of contemporary Chevron
doctrine.
The Court first observed that Chevron deference would apply to some aspects of asylum
adjudications in the 1987 decision of Cardoza-Fonseca. 122 The observation came in dicta
because the Court decided the case on the “pure question of statutory construction” of the
INA provisions for asylum and withholding. 123 The Court distinguished the narrow legal
question before it (of whether the asylum and withholding standards were identical) from a
hypothetical question about the concrete meaning of the phrase “well-founded fear.” The
Court offered the observation that the latter phrase was ambiguous and that courts would
need to respect the agency’s adjudicatory interpretations giving it concrete meaning case by
case, citing to Chevron—a good indication that the Court was assuming that Chevron deference
. . . does not . . . authorize agencies to ‘interpret’ statutes . . . . [I]t recognizes that institutions
may choose among competing constructions of a statutory provision that is within the range
of meanings that the statutory language can support . . . . An institution can make that
choice only by engaging in a policymaking process.”) (footnotes omitted).
121
Herz, supra note 69, at 1891 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
HERMENEUTICS: PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND
POLITICS (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880) on the “distinction between interpretation
and construction.” Id. at 1894. “Interpretation was the narrower task, consisting of ‘the
discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas.’” Id.
(quoting LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra, at 5). “Every text requires
interpretation, [...]‘Construction is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie
beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known from and given in the text—
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the text.’” Id. (quoting
LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra, at 44).
122
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
123
Id. at 446.
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would apply to the agency’s decisions interpreting a well-founded fear (though it did not say
so directly). 124 However, the Court’s observation was not essential to its decision and
involved no further discussion or analysis of Chevron’s applicability in the context of
provisions enacted in the Refugee Act—which the Court did acknowledge was enacted with
the express congressional intent of bringing U.S. refugee law into compliance with the
country’s international obligations under the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Refugee Protocol. 125
Since that time, the Court has gone on to hold directly that Chevron deference is due in
asylum and withholding cases, but an examination of these cases reveals a simple reliance on
the dicta in Cardoza-Fonseca and a continuing lack of robust and specific Chevron analysis,
especially in light of subsequent developments in the jurisprudence. In 1999, the Court held
in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre that it was “clear” that principles of Chevron deference applied to the
statutory scheme of withholding and overturned a circuit court of appeals decision for failing
to give deference to a BIA interpretation. 126 The Court relied on the fact that Congress
charged the Attorney General in a general way with broad powers to implement and
interpret the INA and to determine eligibility for relief in individual cases. 127 The Court also
recognized that deference in the immigration context generally was “especially appropriate”
because of the political nature and potentially sensitive foreign relations implications of
immigration decisions. 128 But the Court relied on Cardoza-Fonseca and these general
principles without otherwise engaging contemporary Chevron case law or discussing the
international roots of the Refugee Act provisions or even engaging in a particularly robust
Step One analysis. Most notably, though the Court cited to Cardoza-Fonseca for the
proposition that Congress had passed the Refugee Act with the intention of complying with
the 1967 Refugee Protocol, it declined to follow that case’s lead in looking to international
understandings of the Protocol to construe the statutory language in a Step One analysis. 129

Id. at 448.
Id. at 436–41 (describing congressional intent to bring the U.S. into compliance with the
Protocol and Convention. The United States was not a party to the original 1951
Convention, which specifically addressed and was limited to refugees created in Europe by
World War II and its aftermath, but its signing of the 1967 Protocol bound it to the
Convention’s terms. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
267, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967.
126
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999).
127
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1), § 1253(h)(2), and
§ 1103(a)(1)).
128
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988) (case
involving a motion to reopen deportation proceedings)).
129
526 U.S. at 428–29 (dismissing proffered UNHCR guidance on the language as merely a
“useful interpretative aid” that the BIA was free to ignore if it so chose and holding that the
reviewing court was bound to accept this interpretation as “fair and permissible”).
124
125
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In 2009, the Court again addressed Chevron deference in the asylum and withholding context
in the case of Negusie v. Holder, 130 citing Aguirre-Aguirre for the proposition that “it is well
settled that ‘principles of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme.’” 131 But
again, the Court did not take a fresh look at the question in light of the development of
Chevron principles, and it did not look specifically at the propriety of deference to provisions
of the Refugee Act. Rather, it relied on rationales for deference in immigration matters
generally, which it lifted almost verbatim from Aguirre-Aguirre. 132
And despite this line of case law and other cases counseling deference in immigration
generally, the Supreme Court and lower courts have found many ways and reasons over the
years to avoid deferring to the BIA and the Attorney General in immigration cases. For
example, as noted above, the Supreme Court avoided deference to the BIA in CardozaFonseca by recognizing judicial primacy in pure statutory construction, looking to legislative
history to divine congressional intent and inaugurating Chevron’s Step One. 133 In 2001, the
Court again declined to proceed to Chevron’s Step Two in two important cases—Zadvydas v.
Davis 134 (challenging indefinite immigration detention) and INS v. St. Cyr 135 (challenging the
retroactivity of recently imposed bars to relief from deportation). 136 In both cases, the Court
disposed of the questions using Step One statutory construction principles. In the 2011 case
of Judulang v. Holder 137 challenging the agency’s implementation of a waiver of deportation,
the Court again rejected the government’s argument for Chevron deference, this time on the
grounds that the question did not involve the interpretation of any direct statutory language,
and the Court instead reviewed the agency’s policy under the Administrative Procedures
Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard. 138 In 2017, in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 139 a case
about the immigration consequences of a conviction, the Court again sidestepped Chevron
deference by going to some lengths to hold that the INA was “unambiguous” in its
555 U.S. 511 (2009).
Id. at 516; Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (“Because the Court of Appeals confronted
questions implicating ‘an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,’ the court
should have applied the principles of deference described in Chevron.”)).
132
555 U.S. at 516–17.
133
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
134
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
135
533 U.S. 289 (2001).
136
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (2001) (applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in Step
One and thus failing to find any ambiguity in the statute) St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 321 n.45
(applying statutory interpretation principles of retroactivity in Step One and finding no
ambiguity in the statute: “Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive
application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, there is, for
Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve.” [internal citations
omitted]).
137
565 U.S. 42 (2011).
138
Id. at 55 (2011) (case challenging agency’s interpretation of the scope of the old § 212(c)
waiver).
139
137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
130
131
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(undefined) use of the phrase “sexual abuse of a minor.” 140 And most recently, in Pereira v.
Sessions, the Court again found a lack of ambiguity that allowed it to avoid Chevron, relying on
the “plain text, the statutory context, and common sense” to hold that a “Notice to Appear”
must include all the statutory elements in order to trigger the “stop-time” rule that limits
eligibility for the relief of cancellation of removal. 141
It is also worth noting that there are broad areas of adjudication under the INA—even very
active areas in which the agency could be argued to have developed its expertise on
questions within its regulatory authority—on which the BIA is given no deference
whatsoever. For example, courts do not defer to the Board on applications of the
categorical analysis used to determine whether a conviction will trigger immigration
consequences, a complex area of law relevant to removability, inadmissibility and “good
moral character” as defined in the INA. Though this is an active area of BIA adjudication
and integral to the enforcement of the INA’s grounds of removal and inadmissibility, courts
have held and the Board itself acknowledges that it is due no deference in its application of
the categorical approach. 142 This is because the approach requires the analysis of the
elements of criminal statutes underlying the prior convictions, an area in which the Board
has no particular expertise in comparison to reviewing federal courts that regularly apply and
interpret criminal statutes. 143
And finally, many courts have historically resisted deferring to the Board and the Attorney
General on immigration decisions, for reasons that appear to range from a lack of
confidence in the competence of the Board to concerns about its objectivity as an
adjudicator. Studies going back to 1990 have found that courts have been less deferential to
BIA decisions than to the decisions of most other agencies. 144 Even earlier, Justice
Blackmun, concurring in the decision in Cardoza-Fonseca in 1987, was blunt in finding fault
Id. at 1564 (2017).
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2114 (2018).
142
See Silva-Trevino (“Silva-Trevino III”), 26 I. & N. Dec. 826, 833 (B.I.A. 2016)
(reaffirming that the application of the categorical approach is not a matter upon which the
Board receives deference) (citing Chairez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820 (B.I.A. 2016); Karimi v.
Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 566 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Although we generally defer to the BIA’s
interpretations of the INA, where, as here, the BIA construes statutes and state law over
which it has no particular expertise, its interpretations are not entitled to deference.”)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); Alvarez v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 288, 292 (4th
Cir. 2016) (“We thus review the pure legal issue in this case de novo.”) (citing EspinalAndrades v. Holder, 777 F.3d 163, 166 (4th Cir. 2015)); Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d
870, 873 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing de novo the issue of whether in California forgery is an
aggravated felony).
143
See, e.g., Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Karimi, 715
F.3d 561 at 566).
144
Pildes, supra note 108, at 29 n.84 (citing Schuck & Elliott, supra note 111, at 1043 (finding
that, in contrast to most agencies whose success rate in judicial review increased significantly
in the wake of Chevron, the BIA’s actually decreased)).
140
141
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with the then-INS for failing to adequately develop the asylum standard that had been
“entrusted to its care,” finding that the agency had allowed itself to be mired in “years of
seemingly purposeful blindness” and had developed a standard that was “strikingly contrary
to plain language and legislative history.” 145 More recently, former Judge Richard Posner has
been a vocal judicial critic of the BIA. He has regularly drawn attention to the deficiencies
of the Board’s process and of the quality of its decisions, as, for example, in a 2005 opinion
in which he detailed numerous BIA decisions that had been overturned for “gaping holes” in
their reasoning, mistakes, unsupported factual conclusions, procedures that constituted “an
affront to [petitioner’s] right to be heard,” hostility and abuse inflicted by immigration
judges, and ignoring elementary principles of administrative law and of common sense. 146 In
short, Judge Posner noted that the agency had been overturned in a “staggering” percentage
of the cases seen in the Seventh Circuit that term and concluded that “the adjudication of
these cases at the administrative level ha[d] fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice.” 147 Five different federal circuit courts refused to defer when Attorney General
Michael Mukasey attempted to rewrite the method for analyzing whether a conviction
should trigger deportation as a “crime involving moral turpitude.” 148 A recent survey of
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450–52 (1987).
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Sosnovskaia v.
Gonzales, 421 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005)).
147
Id. at 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Numerous commentators have also chronicled the dysfunction of the immigration
adjudicatory system, which has only worsened since 2005. See, e.g., Shruti Rana, Chevron
Without the Courts? The Supreme Court’s Recent Chevron Jurisprudence Through an Immigration Lens,
26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 319 (2012) (describing the system as “beset with so many severe
problems—from overburdened courts and an enormous backlog of cases, to charges of bias,
to endemic mistakes, to widely inconsistent decision making”); Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim,
Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 581, 585, 608–23 (2013)
(describing the lack of resources for immigration judges, significant inconsistencies in rates
of favorable decisions, political bias among immigration judges and BIA members, and the
lack of meaningful review at the agency).
148
Attorney General Holder, in vacating Mukasey’s decision in 2015, cited “the decisions of
five courts of appeals rejecting the framework set out in Attorney General Mukasey’s
opinion—which have created disagreement among the circuits and disuniformity in the
Board’s application of immigration law—as well as intervening Supreme Court decisions that
cast doubt on the continued validity of the opinion
.” Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 550, 553 (A.G. 2015). See Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 473–74 (3d Cir.
2009) (showing that it does not accord deference to AG’s “realistic probability”
requirement); Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.2d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that
Silva-Tervino is contrary to the unambiguously express intent of congress, thus the court is
“not bound by the Attorney General’s view”); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 475 (4th
Cir. 2012) (holding that the procedural framework established in Silva-Trevino was not an
authorized exercise of the Attorney General’s authority under Chevron); Guardado-Garcia v.
Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that the court is “bound by [its] circuit’s
precedent,” and declined to follow Silva-Trevino to the extent it was inconsistent); Olivas145
146
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Chevron deference in the circuit courts found that immigration decisions continued to be
somewhat less likely to receive deference than other types of agency decisions. 149
In short, the history of judicial deference to case-by-case adjudicatory immigration decisions
by the BIA and the Attorney General is not entirely consistent, but leans toward a generous
standard that allows the Executive substantial latitude. By the same token, courts have
sometimes been willing to subject the agency’s decisions to rigorous review, with a variety of
justifications. The history of deference in Refugee Act cases, more specifically, has been
similar, in that courts have been inconsistent in their application of Chevron, applying the
doctrine in many cases but not in others.
V.

Applying Contemporary Chevron Doctrine to Refugee Act Provisions

And so, we come with fresh eyes to our question: Should the federal courts employ a
presumption of deference under Chevron to Justice Department decisions on asylum and
withholding of removal? Our analysis is informed not just by the current state of Chevron
jurisprudence, but also by the treaty roots of the Refugee Act provisions and the nature of
the relationship between the Department of Justice, as a prosecutorial immigration agency,
and the politically and otherwise vulnerable asylum seeker.
We have seen that contemporary Chevron jurisprudence reveals, despite the sweeping
language of the original case, that the Supreme Court does not necessarily assume
congressional intent to delegate deference-worthy authority to every executive agency on
every issue on which the agency has general administrative authority. 150 Since Cardoza-Fonseca
and with accelerating frequency in recent years, the Court as a whole and individual justices
have engaged in preliminary Step Zero and Step One analyses that sidestep the need for
deference. The Court has repeatedly expressed separation of powers concerns, finding
reasons to eschew deference in the nature of the agency and its relationship to the question
at hand 151 and in what deference in a particular situation would mean for the scope of the
Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with other Circuits that the
relevant provisions of the INA are not ambiguous and declining Chevron deference to the
Attorney General’s opinion in Silva-Trevino).
149
Barnett & Walker, supra note 71, at 50–51.
150
See supra, section III.A. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (declining to defer
to the IRS despite its clear regulatory authority under the ACA). See also Util. Air Regulatory
Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2489; City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (stating that ambiguity alone does not necessarily indicate congressional intent to
delegate authority to the executive).
151
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (finding it unlikely that Congress intended to delegate
deference-worthy authority to the IRS in its administration of the Affordable Care Act
because of its lack of expertise in health care policy); City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 309 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (listing “the subject matter of the relevant provision—for instance, its
distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties” among the factors that affect
appropriateness of deference).
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agency’s authority. 152 The Court has framed the question as whether it was likely that
Congress intended to delegate unchecked authority to a particular agency on a particular
question, though in reality it appears to be engaging in its own analysis of whether deference
to executive authority seems appropriate in a given context. The Court’s cases appear to
reflect a context-specific adaptation of deference doctrine, a “more grounded, realist’s stance
on the deference issue” that Richard Pildes maintains courts have long taken despite
Chevron’s broad technical claims. 153
The context of asylum and withholding law has at least two distinctive features that bear on
whether it would be reasonable to assume that Congress intended for the Justice
Department to receive deference in this area of adjudications: the treaty source of the
statutory obligation of non-refoulement (along with its definition of refugee and the bars to
protection) 154 and the predominantly prosecutorial mission of the agency, which runs
directly counter to the obligation to protect. These distinctive characteristics come into play
both in a threshold Step Zero analysis and in Step One statutory interpretation.
A. Step Zero: The Threshold Question of Deference to the Justice Department
on Humanitarian Protection
The Court’s willingness to question the appropriateness of deference because of the
relationship between the question at issue and the institutional mandate and capacities of the
agency raises a number of important threshold (that is, Step Zero) questions in the
immigration context generally and the refugee context specifically. First, is it ever
appropriate to defer to an enforcement agency on politically sensitive questions of relief
from enforcement, especially when the stakes for individual rights are so high—and, in the
refugee context, when protection from enforcement is externally mandated? Second, as a
practical matter, does the BIA have interpretive expertise or the institutional resources that
would warrant deference to interpretation of provisions that implicate international and
foreign sources of law? And finally, can treaty-mandated humanitarian protection of
vulnerable populations be considered matters of “policy” for which political accountability is
desirable or even permissible?
1. Prosecutor as protector?
The first question of institutional mandate and capacity is fundamental: whether it makes
sense as a matter of balance of powers to entrust (without a meaningful check) the
protection of vulnerable individuals to a prosecutorial agency that is deeply committed to
enforcing the law against those very same individuals? In other words, given the entrenched
Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2439.
Pildes, supra note 108, at 29.
154
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987). For example, compare Refugee
Convention Art. 33(1) with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); compare Refugee Convention Art.
1(A)(2) with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); compare Refugee Convention Art. 1(f) and Art. 33(2) with 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2).
152
153
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institutional commitment of the Justice Department to stopping irregular migration, does it
make sense to defer to that same agency on the humanitarian protection of irregular
migrants?
a. The Department of Justice as a Politically Sensitive,
Prosecutorial Immigration Enforcement Agency
The Department of Justice is one of the principal federal agencies that carries out
enforcement of immigration laws as part of its “ordinary statutory duties.” 155 The Attorney
General, as head of the Department, is also the nation’s principal law enforcement officer. 156
While the Department is also charged with granting relief from deportation, Attorney
General Sessions revealed much about the weight of the law enforcement and deterrence
role of the Department in the emphasis he gave them. For example, in a recent speech on
immigration to the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, he said, “We know whose side we’re
on: we’re on the side of police and we’re on the side of the American people.” 157 In another
speech, at the Executive Office for Immigration Review, he described the Department’s
commitment to enforcement:
Let’s be clear: we have a firm goal, and that is to end the lawlessness that
now exists in our immigration system. This Department of Justice is
committed to using every available resource to meet that goal. We will act
strategically with our colleagues at DHS and across the government, and we
will not hesitate to redeploy resources and alter policies to meet new
challenges as they arise . . . .. I have put in place a “zero tolerance” policy for
See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 309 (Breyer, J., concurring). Numerous federal agencies
perform immigration functions, including, most obviously, enforcement and application
adjudication in the Department of Homeland Security, but also, for example, visa processing
operations in the Department of State and refugee resettlement and detention of minors in
the Department of Health & Human Services. Given the deep investment of the DHS in
the expulsion of unauthorized noncitizens and in the deterrence of irregular migration, the
argument in this section—against deference to an enforcement agency—could also be made
in the context of challenges to DHS decisions restricting a variety of forms of relief from
removal, including for example, the decision to terminate a country’s designation under
Temporary Protected Status. For purposes of Chevron deference in asylum and withholding
cases, the decisions of the executive agencies reach the courts through Justice Department
decisions, so the DOJ will be our focus here.
156
Office of the Attorney General, About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office. The DOJ webpage on the Office of the Attorney
General explains the history and role of the office of the AG: “The Judiciary Act of 1789
created the Office of the Attorney General which evolved over the years into the head of the
Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer of the Federal Government.”
157
Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation,
Los Angeles, CA (June 26, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generalsessions-delivers-remarks-criminal-justice-legal-foundation.
155
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illegal entry on our Southwest border. If you cross the Southwest border
unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple. 158
The immigration prosecution context has traditionally been considered “civil” because
removal proceedings are at least nominally not intended to punish, 159 but they undeniably
subject individuals to harsh sanctions, including indefinite imprisonment during the
pendency of the proceedings, 160 separation from family, and deportation, a sanction that has
been rightly recognized as potentially causing one to lose “all that makes life worth living.” 161
The harshness is particularly clear in the context of asylum and withholding applications,
where the applicant claims a fear of likely harm or in many cases even death if deported.
Even beyond the severe consequences of deportation, however, the Justice Department has
also been actively engaged in criminally prosecuting immigration violators for more than the
last decade and through three presidential administrations. While Attorney General Sessions
was more vocal than other Attorneys General have been about the immigration enforcement
role of the Department, that role was not new under his leadership. Long before the Trump
administration, prosecutions for the offenses of illegal entry and illegal reentry 162 represented
the majority of criminal prosecutions brought nationwide by the Department. In Fiscal Year
2016, under President Obama, the Department prosecuted 64,297 cases of just these two
offenses of irregular migration. 163 This number outstripped the Department’s total for all
non-immigration-related criminal prosecutions, including for drugs, weapons, fraud and
terrorism cases, which totaled 63,405 for FY16. 164 These high rates of prosecution have
been consistent trends in the Department’s allocation of its resources for the last decade, 165

Sessions Remarks to Legal Training Program, supra note 28.
But see Maureen A. Sweeney & Hillary Scholten, Penalty and Proportionality in Deportation for
Crimes, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 11 (2011). Also see César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Immigration Detention as punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014); Gabriel J.
Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the Criminal Process,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1417 (2011); Peter L. Markovitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1299 (2011).
160
See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim,
538 U.S. 510 (2003).
161
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922); see also Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
U.S. 6, 10 (1984) (holding that deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment or exile).
162
See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 and § 1326.
163
See TRAC REPORTS, Table 2, Top Charges Filed,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446/.
164
Id.
165
Id. Fig.1: Criminal Immigration Prosecutions over the last 20 years. See also Michael T.
Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of Federal Immigration Crimes:
Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth (Pew Research Center, Mar. 18, 2014) (showing that illegal
reentry convictions increased twenty-eight-fold from 1992 to 2012, representing 48% of the
158
159
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demonstrating the Department’s sustained investment in criminal prosecution of
immigration violations. Of course, with its “zero tolerance” policy of criminally prosecuting
all those who cross the border illegally, the Trump Justice Department has made it an even
“higher priority.” 166 Attorney General Sessions encouraged U.S. Attorneys to use the full
extent of the criminal law to, among other things, “deter[] first-time improper entrants” and
directed every district in the country to designate a “Border Security Coordinator” to
convene regular meetings with DHS to coordinate immigration enforcement initiatives,
training and information sharing. Finally, using a longstanding but previously seldom
invoked INA provision, Sessions gave the order for U.S. Attorneys to bypass separate
removal proceedings entirely and to directly seek judicial orders of deportation in the U.S.
District Courts in “each federal [criminal] case” where practicable. 167
Sessions is a particularly stark example of an Attorney General for whom shutting down
irregular migration was among the highest of law enforcement priorities, even where those
coming to the border irregularly are advancing claims to humanitarian protection. The
stakes for asylum seekers are heightened by the enormous resources of the enforcement
apparatus (which includes both Justice Department and all three immigration sub-agencies
of DHS), the extreme volatility of immigration as a political issue, and the particular
vulnerability of those applicants—who, by definition, are claiming a threat of persecution
and who, as noncitizens, have no access to influence the political process. But as noted
earlier, Sessions did not create the prosecutorial role of the Attorney General or of the
Justice Department in immigration enforcement, nor the danger that it would be exploited
to further an administration’s political agenda at the expense of humanitarian protection. He
merely took full advantage of an infrastructure that already gave his office enormous power
to influence—and limit—the rights of asylum seekers through the Department’s Executive
Office for Immigration Review and the prosecutorial U.S. Attorneys Office, as well as
through the Attorney General’s own power to certify and decide cases himself.
b.

Chevron and the Prosecutor

Asylum seekers’ only administrative safeguards in the face of this enforcement juggernaut are
in the hands of the very same agency enforcing the law against them. The Justice
Department is responsible for enforcing both the prohibition on irregular migration and the
nation’s obligation of non-refoulement. While many nations’ asylum systems and even the
growth in the number of individuals sentenced in federal criminal proceedings over that
period).
166
Attorney General Memorandum for Federal Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border:
Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1049751/download. See also Attorney
General Sessions, memo for all federal prosecutors, Renewed Commitment to Criminal
Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/956856/download [hereinafter Renewed
Commitment].
167
Sessions, Renewed Commitment, supra note 166.
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United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) institutionally separate
immigration enforcement decision makers from those who make refugee determinations, as
a precaution to executive abuse, 168 there is no such separation of asylum adjudicators among
immigration judges or at the BIA. All judges and Board Members move back and forth
between asylum and all other kinds of removal cases as part of a single institutional entity.
The federal circuit court of appeals, therefore, represent the first access asylum applicants
have to a decision-maker who is not part of an immigration enforcement agency. 169 As a
result, the rigor with which they can review the agency’s decisions is vitally important, as is,
by extension, the question of whether they must presumptively defer to those decisions
under Chevron.
The Supreme Court has in recent years repeatedly reached back to the touchstone of the
balance of powers principles underlying Chevron, concerned that the Chevron doctrine has
allowed agencies to usurp both legislative power that should be held by Congress and
interpretive power that should be exercised by the courts. The justices’ concerns about the
abuse of executive power and inordinate claims to executive deference seem very apt in the
asylum context. Congress intended to comply fully with the requirements of non-refoulement
in passing the Refugee Act. The Justice Department, whose “ordinary statutory duties” 170 do
not involve the protection but rather the prosecution of irregular migrants, has its own
executive—and prosecutorial—imperatives. Given the political importance of strong border
control, the Department has every incentive to interpret Refugee Act provisions to maximize
its ability to deny protection and to remove or repel those who arrive or stay in the country
outside normal channels. The Attorney General, as the politically appointed head of the
Department, is both very powerful in influencing the interpretation of asylum law and
demonstrably sensitive to the volatile political consequences of irregular migration. As such,
he or she often acts as an instrument of the broader administration and for its political
purposes. It is not at all a stretch to imagine that these incentives and pressures could color
Canada, for example, separates the decision makers in its Refugee Protection Division and
its Refugee Appeal Division institutionally from those in the Immigration Division.
Organizational Structure, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, https://irbcisr.gc.ca/en/organizational-structure/Pages/index.aspx. The USCIS Asylum Office is in a
division separate from other USCIS adjudications and is staffed with a dedicated corps of
asylum officers, specially trained to adjudicate asylum applications.
169
Affirmative asylum applications are decided by Asylum Officers from DHS. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.2(a). Applications that are not approved there are referred to the immigration courts
for review by an immigration judge who works for the Justice Department. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.14(c). Immigration judges also hear “defensive” asylum claims filed initially by people
who are already in removal proceedings and claims for withholding of removal. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.2(b). Immigration judge decisions are appealable to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, also part of the DOJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). Applicants whose asylum cases are
denied by the BIA have the right to petition for review at the federal circuit court of appeals.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
170
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
168
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the Department’s statutory interpretations to improperly limit the congressional intent to
provide protection. To the contrary, history shows that they have and predictably will
continue to do so. Given the distorting influence of the Justice Department’s structural
investment in its role as an immigration enforcement agency, courts serve as a crucial check
on the executive’s considerable enforcement power and should rigorously review BIA and
Attorney General decisions, to ensure compliance with the congressional intent to comply
with non-refoulement obligations.
A refusal to defer to the Justice Department in matters of asylum is akin to the principle that
there is no deference due to a prosecutor’s interpretation of a criminal statute. As Justice
Scalia observed in his concurrence in the case of Crandon v. United States, 171 prosecutors have
an incentive to “err in the direction of inclusion rather than exclusion—assuming, to be on
the safe side, that the statute may cover more than is entirely apparent.” 172 For this reason,
again in Justice Scalia’s words, “we have never thought that the interpretation of those
charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to deference.” 173 To do otherwise
would create a “rule of severity” rather than the traditional rule of lenity. 174
Alina Das, considering deference in the federal habeas context in the wake of City of Arlington,
argues that the separation of powers concerns highlighted by Chief Justice Roberts in his
dissent in that case can and should affect a court’s consideration of whether Congress likely
intended to delegate a question to an executive agency. 175 She poses the two-sided question:
(1) Are there reasons to think that Congress intended to delegate its law-making authority
and (2) Are there reasons to think it would not delegate its authority on the particular
question at issue? 176 Das argues that the strong liberty interest at issue in habeas and the
prominence in the Constitution of the protection of the right to petition for habeas relief give
rise to a kind of “anti-deference” with which a court should regard the detaining executive
agency, because Congress would have been unlikely to cede primary law-making authority on
such an important liberty issue to the very executive responsible for the detention. 177 Where
an individual who has lost her liberty confronts a government agency’s detention power, Das
argues for the courts as a robust check on agency power. 178 She concludes that where

494 U.S. 152 (1990).
Id. at 178 (Scalia, J., concurring)
173
Id. at 177; Cf. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991) (noting but not
deciding whether a higher standard may be required to overcome the non-delegation
doctrine that would permit Congress to delegate to an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations creating criminal liability).
174
Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation in
Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 189 (2015).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 150.
177
Id. at 151–58.
178
Id. at 202–05.
171
172

38

Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing / Protection

individual liberty is at stake in a habeas proceeding, it is proper for the courts to exercise
robust review of the executive detention decision. 179
This argument finds echoes in the separation of powers rationale of Chevron, and its
principles apply equally well to the context of applications for asylum and withholding of
removal. There are significant reasons to think that Congress would not—or may not even
have the power to—delegate to the enforcement agency unchecked authority to interpret
provisions implementing the nation’s obligation of non-refoulement. 180 Asylum and
withholding applications, like habeas petitions, involve a strong, fundamental individual right
(to the personal security inherent in humanitarian protection and to relief from persecution),
guaranteed by an authoritative external source of law (the Refugee Convention), and at
potential risk of abuse by an executive otherwise empowered to compromise the right
(through its authority to exclude or deport individuals not authorized to be present in the
country). Non-refoulement, like the fundamental right to liberty at issue in habeas, operates as a
direct check on executive power and has profound consequences for individuals and their
most basic human rights. All of these factors function as reasons Congress would not want
to defer to the executive agency, as “anti-deference” factors.
While it is true that Justice Scalia and the majority dismissed the “fox guarding the
henhouse” concern in the civil regulatory context in City of Arlington, there are important
differences between that situation and the question of deference in non-refoulement and
humanitarian protection. 181 For one thing, non-refoulement, like the liberty interest in the
criminal or habeas context, is a fundamental interest with serious consequences for personal
liberty and even the survival of the individual. For another, there is a structural institutional
difference. The Court in City of Arlington was considering who should decide the breadth of
an agency’s power to regulate third parties. By contrast, with asylum and withholding—as in
the criminal or habeas context—the question is who should police the agency’s self-regulation
on a matter of fundamental individual liberty. The need for an external check in that
circumstance is amplified.
As a matter of separation of powers, there are thus good reasons to believe that Congress
would not have left the fundamental principle of non-refoulement in the unchecked hands of
the executive enforcement agency. As with the criminal prosecutor, Congress would have
expected the courts to exercise robust review of the enforcement agency’s interpretations.
Unlike the Department of Justice, the courts are not invested on an institutional level in the
mission of punishing, deporting or excluding those not authorized to be in the country or of
deterring future unlawful immigration. As such, they are in a better position as a structural
matter to defend the principle and the nation’s obligation of non-refoulement. In the absence
of an express indication otherwise, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended them
to do so vigorously.

Id. at 205–06.
Id. at 173–74.
181
569 U.S. 290, 307 (2013).
179
180
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2.

Interpretive Deference in Light of Agency Expertise and Capacity

As we have seen, another possible justification for Chevron deference is that the agency has a
subject matter expertise that the courts do not. How does a possible claim of expertise by
the BIA and the Attorney General affect the Chevron calculus?
The EPA expertise to which the Supreme Court gave deference in Chevron was in the area of
the regulation of industrial air pollution, 182 and involved understanding not just the structure
and terms of a statute, but also the technical, scientific details of air quality and industrial
outputs. In that substantively technical context, the Supreme Court held that the agency,
immersed as it was in those fields of knowledge, was more likely than a court to have the
technical know-how to fully understand and make the best decisions about policy matters
that had been left ambiguous in the statutory scheme. 183 This expertise rationale supports
deference in such areas as environmental, health care, financial and other scientific or
technical fields, where implementation policy questions require a kind of “scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge” akin to that recognized in an expert witness in a
trial context. 184 In fact, in a 2008 empirical study of cases reviewing agency decisions,
Eskridge and Baer found that the Supreme Court often appeared to act along lines of
institutional competence, being more likely to defer to agencies in matters in which the
Court concluded it was at an “institutional disadvantage” because of inferior knowledge
either related to national security and foreign affairs or to technical or economic
regulation. 185 (Notably, although the authors classified immigration agency decisions as
relating to foreign affairs, they found the Court less likely to defer on immigration.) 186
The expertise required to interpret the INA, however, does not require familiarity with
technical or scientific information, nor with the workings of an industry, nor even, for the
most part, with the mechanics of immigration enforcement. And though immigration
decisions are sometimes said to implicate delicate matters of foreign relations, the truth of
the matter is that it is the very unusual case that affects anyone or anything other than the
parties themselves. The vast majority of immigration cases require expertise, not in foreign
affairs, but rather in the legal interpretation of a complex statutory and regulatory scheme.
This demands expertise in legal analysis and the application of law to facts—precisely the
sort of expertise that federal courts have. 187 As Daniel Kanstroom notes, the interpretation
of INA provisions is more “law-like” and less “policy-like” than many questions of statutory
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845–46 (1984). The case revolved
around the meaning of the phrase “stationary source” in the 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments.
183
Id. at 865.
184
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702.
185
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 108, at 1083.
186
Id. at 1145.
187
Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
581, 630–31 (2013) (citing John S. Kane, Refining Chevron—Restoring Judicial Review to Protect
Religious Refugees, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 513, 552 (2008)).
182
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implementation and there is both theoretical support and precedent in the Supreme Court’s
Chevron jurisprudence for deferring less broadly to executive interpretation of such terms
than to pure policy decisions. 188 Perhaps this comfort with adjudication and the lack of need
for any technical expertise is one reason Eskridge and Baer found courts less likely to defer
on immigration issues than on other agency decisions.
And in fact, the research and legal analysis required for asylum and withholding
adjudications arguably require an even more specialized legal expertise than the average case
or even the average immigration case, because they can implicate international and
comparative law on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention. As discussed below, and
in keeping with the Supreme Court’s recent example in Abbott v. Abbott, 189 interpretation of
Convention-based provisions properly includes reference to international and comparative
law sources, either on grounds that the interpretation should fulfill congressional intent to
comply with Convention obligations or because such obligations are themselves “the law of
the land” as incorporated treaty provisions. 190
The BIA is an administrative adjudicatory body with experience interpreting the INA, but
none in interpreting international instruments or in comparative or international human
rights jurisprudence. 191 Nor does it have expertise in the history of humanitarian concerns
or the international context in which the Refugee Convention was negotiated and drafted or
in which the United States signed on to the 1967 Protocol. 192 The Attorney General, who
only infrequently engages in immigration adjudication, has even less familiarity with
application of the INA or of international or comparative sources relevant to the
Convention. 193
See Kanstroom, supra note 119, at 806.
560 U.S. 1 (2010).
190
See id at 9–10; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449–50 (1987); see also Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 886 (1987) (arguing that “International law is the law of the
land”); see also infra Section V.B.
191
See Merrill, Step Zero, supra note 88, at 786 (stating that “even assuming that agencies have
a superior understanding of the statutes. . . it does not follow that they have much, if any,
understanding of constitutional law, international law, or federalism”).
192
See Irene Scharf, Un-Torturing the Definition of Torture and Employing the Rule of Immigration
Lenity, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 42 (2013) (arguing for similar reasons against deference to the
BIA on interpretation of the Convention Against Torture because the Board lacks
international legal or humanitarian expertise).
193
Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has written that contemporary practice has
given the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) the role of advisor to the Attorney General
for immigration cases certified for his decision. Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick
Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General's Review Authority,
101 IOWA L REV 841, 854 (2016), citing 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(f) (2015) (explaining that the duties
of the OLC include, “[w]hen requested, advising the Attorney General in connection with
his review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals and other organizational units
188
189

41

Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing / Protection

Furthermore, even if they had the institutional will to do so, the immigration courts and the
Board do not have the capacity to develop expertise in the international and comparative law
of refugee protection. The immigration court system suffers from serious institutional
capacity challenges that compromise its decision making and limit the time and
consideration it can give to any single case. While the history of this dysfunction is
longstanding, 194 the immigration courts are in more crisis now than ever. Approximately 300
immigration judges nationwide are struggling under the weight of a backlog of nearly
764,000 cases, and the average case takes 717 days to complete. 195 And they do so in the
midst of a chronic lack of resources and antiquated systems. The current Justice
Department approach to reducing the backlog of cases is to implement policies to pressure
judges to speed up adjudications, including the new requirement that immigration judges
close out at least 700 cases a year in order to keep a satisfactory job performance rating. 196
This pressure to complete cases quickly will certainly not foster an environment in which
research into areas of law seen as extraneous (and politically undesirable) is likely to be
encouraged. And despite their enormous caseloads and case completion expectations,
immigration judges have less institutional support than Article III federal judges. They often
share law clerks rather than having one or more clerks assigned solely to them. There is no
electronic filing in immigration courts, so file management is an ongoing challenge. The
chronic lack of legal representation also hampers the system, both slowing cases down and
worsening the quality of case preparation and, presumably, decision making. 197 And asylum
and withholding cases are already among the most complicated cases presented in these
courts, often including complex legal questions, factual contexts requiring nuanced
understanding of the applicant’s personal circumstances and social dynamics in the home
country, evidentiary difficulties incident to the applicant’s flight from persecution, and
applicants and witnesses who often suffer the effects of trauma. This severe and chronic
under-resourcing of the system makes it unlikely that the immigration courts will develop
of the Department”). Like the Attorney General himself, the OLC has no regular
involvement and no particular expertise in immigration adjudication.
194
Immigration Judge Dana Leigh Marks sees the chronic and crisis-level under-resourcing
of the immigration courts as a longstanding indication of their being “dramatically
overshadowed” by the parts of the agencies charged with enforcement. Marks, supra note 30,
at 49.
195
See Immigration Court Backlog Tool,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/(Last updated Aug. 2018).
196
EOIR Performance Plan, supra note 40. For a good discussion of why this one-size-fitsall requirement is likely to lead to problematic limitations on due process in many courts, see
Wheeler, supra note 40.
197
See, e.g., CTR FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ENSURING COUNSEL FOR
IMMIGRANTS FACING DEPORTATION IN THE D.C. METROPOLITAN AREA (Mar. 2017),
https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/DC_Access_to_Counsel_rev4_033117%
20%281%29.pdf (citing studies showing that only 37% of all respondents nationally were
represented in removal proceedings and finding only 19% and 29% of detained respondents
represented in the Baltimore and Arlington Immigration Courts, respectively).
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additional expertise in identifying and understanding international and comparative sources
of law.
As noted earlier, courts already recognize a number of areas of statutory interpretation in
which the Board and the immigration courts are not given deference because of a lack of
expertise, such as questions of the applicability of the crime-based grounds of removal to
particular offenses. Just as the Board lacks expertise that would warrant deference in this
area of legal interpretation, it has no interpretive advantage over the federal courts in
applying Refugee Act provisions rooted in international law and interpreted by an
international legal community. This is an exercise of statutory interpretation at which the
courts are most expert, and especially where international and comparative law are
implicated—as they are in Refugee Act cases—it makes little sense for the federal courts to
defer to the BIA or the Attorney General on expertise grounds.
3.

Fundamental Human Rights and the Question of “Policy” Subject to
Political Accountability

Finally, there is the question of whether interpretation of Refugee Act provisions is truly a
question of “policy” of the type for which the Chevron Court counseled deference to the
executive. Does interpretation of the proper reach of asylum and withholding law implicate
“competing views of the public interest” 198 among which immigration agencies are free to
choose? And is it a matter on which Congress was likely to find political accountability to be
an advantage, or even acceptable?
As discussed earlier, much of the INA represents the results of congressional choices on
questions of public policy on which there continue to be competing views of the public
good. For example, there are genuine debates about whether it is in the public interest to
have more or fewer visas issued each year based on family relationships, about whether
higher or lower levels of immigration are good for economic growth and security, and about
whether it will enhance or harm the public good to regularize the status of individuals who
entered the country illegally. 199 Thus, where the statute leaves a gap regarding
implementation details of those legislative policy choices, Chevron doctrine would find it
preferable for the executive agency to make further policy choices, rather than the courts, on
grounds that the political system allows for electoral accountability for those choices.
For example, under the Obama administration, USCIS developed a procedure by regulation
to facilitate provisional approval of the waiver needed for spouses of US citizens who had
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
See, e.g., Reforming American Immigration for Strong Economy (RAISE) Act, S. 1720,
115th Cong. (2018), a bill recently proposed in the United States Senate that proposes policy
choices that would significantly alter the INA with regard to some of these issues. Compare
Section 5, allocating permanent resident visas on the basis of a point system that takes into
account many factors but does not include close family ties; with 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a),
allocating permanent resident visas on the basis of family sponsorship.
198
199
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entered the country illegally to become permanent residents. 200 There was nothing in the
statute that required this procedure, but it was an implementation decision that took into
account several interacting provisions of the law—the allocation of immigrant visas for
spouses of U.S. citizens, 201 a disqualification for those who had entered illegally from
obtaining permanent residence without leaving the country, 202 a ban on reentry for someone
who has left the country after a period of unlawful presence in the U.S., 203 and a waiver of
that ban. 204 In this case, the executive agency filled a procedural gap left by Congress, acting
to implement a policy favoring the unification of the families of U.S. citizens. This was an
example of a normative, policy-based, prescriptive decision by an executive agency in a
matter on which there were competing visions of the public interest. This was one of a
series of immigration related policy choices for which the Obama administration and the
Democrats were arguably held accountable in the 2016 election, in which immigration issues
featured prominently. Implementation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program is another. 205
Contrast these with the provisions of the Refugee Act, which did not implement policies
chosen freely by Congress, but rather serve to incorporate the nation’s non-negotiable
obligations under the Refugee Convention. Implementing that Act, then, the executive is no
more free than Congress was to make decisions to favor or disfavor policies of its own
choosing to affect the meaning of those obligations. While there may be aspects of asylum
and withholding law that go beyond Convention requirements on which there is room to
legislate policy choices, to the extent that INA provisions derive from the Refugee
Convention, the executive is obligated to implement them in accordance with the nation’s
treaty responsibilities. This is a fundamental difference between the INA’s refugee
provisions and many other parts of the statute. The Convention-based provisions do not
represent independent policy choices, and it is incumbent on the courts to engage in robust
review to ensure that the executive’s interpretations comply with the nation’s international
obligations and with the intent of Congress to fulfill those obligations.
Another indication that Refugee Act provisions are not the type of “policy” matters
contemplated by the Chevron Court is the inappropriateness of political accountability as a
value in decision making about the fundamental right to humanitarian protection. The
78 Fed. Reg. 536–78 (Jan. 3, 2013); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e).
8 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
202
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (requiring inspection and admission or parole for eligibility to adjust to
permanent resident status).
203
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).
204
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(v).
205
See, e.g., Diana C. Mutz, Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential
Vote, Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. (Apr. 23, 2018),
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2018/04/18/1718155115; and Philip Klinkner, Yes,
Trump’s Hard-Line Immigration Stance Helped Him Win the Election — But It Could Be His Undoing,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-klinkerimmigration-election-20170417-story.html.
200
201
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Chevron Court presumed that political accountability would be preferable for the decider of
the policy questions it envisioned—to reflect the will of the majority on substantive
questions of normative importance. 206 Yet the will of the majority has never been a useful
touchstone in the protection of persecuted minorities. To the contrary, in many cases
political accountability and pressure are likely to be negative influences and actually impair
the quality of protection decisions for vulnerable individuals who may defy majority
expectations in some way. Asylum and withholding of removal law are specifically intended
to protect individuals with minority political views, those with unpopular religious beliefs or
practices, and members of marginalized social groups such as those who defy gender norms,
all of whom face serious harm and sometimes even the threat of death because of who they
are and what they believe. The protection of these vulnerable outsiders is the last context in
which we should want political accountability to influence decision making.
Furthermore, large movements of refugee populations can and do evoke large-scale political
opposition that has nothing to do with the legitimacy of their claims as refugees, as
evidenced by the backlash against Syrian refugees in both Europe and the United States. 207
Another example is the treatment of mainly Central American asylum seekers who have
arrived at the southwest U.S. border in recent years. Successive federal administrations have
made a series of decisions designed to discourage these applicants from arriving and from
seeking protection, at least in part because of the political ramifications of the
administration’s being seen as weak on immigration issues and out of control of the
border. 208 These decisions had nothing at all to do with the legitimacy of the protection
claims these applicants asserted but rather represented efforts by politically accountable
leaders to restrict access to protection for political purposes.
See, e.g., Kenneth Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 312
(1986) (executive deference allows an agency to pursue “what it perceives to be the will of
the people”), cited in Pappas, supra note 71, at 979 n.6.
207
See, e.g., Laura Pitel, Asser Khattab & Erika Solomon, Syrian Refugees Under Pressure as
Neighbours’ Goodwill Runs Out, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/bf696a82-1d47-11e8-956a-43db76e69936; Ashley Fantz &
Ben Brumfield, More than Half the Nation’s Governors Say Syrian Refugees Not Welcome, CNN
(Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/world/paris-attacks-syrian-refugeesbacklash/index.html.
208
For a time, the Obama administration explicitly justified its policy of detaining women
and children who turned themselves into Customs and Border Protection agents as a means
of deterring further asylum seekers from making the journey to the United States. See Order,
R.I.L.R. et al. v. Johnson et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00011-JEB, (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015)
(“Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from detaining class members for the purpose of
deterring future immigration to the United States and from considering deterrence of such
immigration as a factor in such custody determinations.”). This policy was applied to the
applicants regardless of the merits of their asylum claims and regardless of the fact that 88%
of the families passed an interview establishing that they had a credible fear of persecution in
their country. Regarding the rate of positive credible fear interviews, see Sessions Remarks to
EOIR, supra note 2.
206
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The role of the courts in guaranteeing individual humanitarian protection is analogous to
their role in the civil rights context, where it has long been recognized that a higher level of
protection and scrutiny is appropriate for discrete, insular and vulnerable minorities. 209
Asylum seekers are universally disenfranchised, by definition, as individuals who are outside
their countries of citizenship. The Supreme Court has noted that because “noncitizens
cannot vote, they are particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.” 210 It follows that they
are—equally by definition—not able to advance their own interests through normal political
channels, rendering meaningless for them the justification and any purported advantage
factored into Chevron doctrine of having those interests decided by the political branches of
government. The political vulnerability of individuals seeking humanitarian protection
requires both the application of the international Convention establishing their basic
individual rights as refugees and robust, independent judicial review exercised without fear of
political repercussion. These dynamics—together with consideration of the prosecutorial
role of the Justice Department and the lack of a meaningful interpretive advantage in the
BIA or the Attorney General over the courts—weigh heavily in favor of a Step Zero finding
that Chevron deference to the politically accountable executive is inappropriate in the refugee
context.
B. Step One: Statutory Interpretation, Congressional Intent and Charming Betsy
Even if a court were to go beyond these Step Zero considerations and find it appropriate to
apply Chevron deference to the Justice Department’s interpretation of asylum and
withholding provisions, Chevron’s Step One analysis calls for rigorous analysis of the statutory
provisions before any deference comes into play. Courts are to employ the ordinary tools of
statutory construction to determine the intent of Congress on a particular question.
As a general matter, in the asylum and withholding context, the Supreme Court has already
held that “one of Congress' primary purposes [in passing the Refugee Act of 1980] was to
bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.” 211 The Court majority came to this conclusion on the
basis of the textual structure of the statute, which included a number of nearly verbatim
provisions from the Refugee Convention, and of numerous statements of intent from the
legislative history. 212 Following immediately upon its finding of a manifest congressional
intent to comply with international law, the Court concluded that it was “thus appropriate to
consider what the phrase ‘well-founded fear’ means with relation to the Protocol.” 213 This simple
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 n.39 (2001) (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and
Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1626
(2000). See generally Paul Chaffin, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron
Apply to BIA Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503 (2013).
211
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987).
212
Id. at 437.
213
Id. (emphasis added).
209
210
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sentence has profound consequences for how we think about what Congress was doing in
passing the Refugee Act. To the extent that it was incorporating the obligations of the
Protocol into domestic law, Congress was not freely exercising its constitutional legislative
authority to make policy choices, but was rather importing the substantive provisions already
chosen by the drafters of the Refugee Convention and already agreed to by the President
who signed the Convention and the Senate which ratified it. This is why it was appropriate
for the Court to look to the Protocol for the meaning of the phrase “well-founded fear”,
because the Protocol and the Convention—rather than Congress’s policy choices—were the
substantive source of the statutory provisions.
This insight, that Congress was implementing already existing, external obligations in the
Refugee Act rather than its own policy choices, in turn, has important consequences for how
we should think about the provisions for Chevron purposes. For Step One purposes, as the
majority in Cardoza-Fonseca recognized, it supports a statutory interpretation process that
looks to international understandings of Convention obligations, to identify what it was that
Congress intended to comply with. Reference to international law sources and to the
interpretations of sister signatory nations and judicial bodies thus assist a court in applying
the “ordinary canon of statutory interpretation” that provisions should be interpreted to
carry out the intent of Congress. To the extent that courts can use those international
sources to construe the meaning of terms in the statute, 214 they are engaging in simple
statutory interpretation under Chevron Step One, identifying the expressed intent of
Congress, and the question of deference to an agency interpretation does not arise. 215
Such sources could include UNHCR guidance, as well as the statutes and court decisions
of other signatory nations and international tribunals such as the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. See the discussion of Abbott v.
Abbott, infra, for an example of the use such sources by the Supreme Court in interpreting a
statute that derives from international treaty obligations.
215
It should be noted that this reference to international sources has never been
noncontroversial. Justice Scalia, though concurring in the opinion in Cardoza-Fonseca,
disagreed vigorously with the majority on its reliance on extra-statutory sources to determine
congressional intent. He took the textualist position that the statute itself conveyed its
meaning and that reference to legislative history, purpose, and the underlying Protocol was
therefore both unnecessary and unwise. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452–55. This difference
of opinion would persist in Chevron jurisprudence down through the years. Justice Scalia
would famously maintain his suspicion of extra-textual sources for divining congressional
intent—indeed of the ability of any court to know Congress’s intent at all—and insist on
reliance on the statutory text alone. Scalia, supra note 66, at 517. See Gluck, supra note 98, at
82 (“Textualism’s founders were heavily influenced by the legal realists, who argued that
collective legislative intent is an impossible notion.”). By the same token, Justice Stevens,
writing decades after Cardoza-Fonseca, confirmed again his position that even where a statute
is silent, it can be appropriate to use other sources to determine congressional intent in
Chevron’s Step One. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 532 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Nonetheless, the Court as a whole undoubtedly shifted in a
textualist direction during Justice Scalia’s tenure. See Gluck, supra note 98, at 66 (arguing that
214
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However, general reference to the intent of Congress is not the only “ordinary canon[] of
statutory construction” that supports reference to international and comparative authority in
interpreting asylum and withholding provisions under Chevron’s Step One. 216 The 1804 case
of Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy 217 and its progeny established the principle that
statutes should be construed where possible to avoid conflict with international law. 218 This
case law is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which provides: “This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land. . . .” 219 Relying on this constitutional prioritizing of treaty
law, the Supreme Court in Charming Betsy held that “an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. . . .” 220
And while it is true that Congress can choose to enact domestic law that conflicts with
international law, it must give a “clear indication” of that intent in order to do so. 221 Absent
express language indicating such an intent, statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with
international obligations. 222 This principle has become a “classic tenet of statutory
interpretation” 223 based on the assumption that Congress takes into account the nation’s
treaty obligations and the sovereign interests of other nations when it legislates. 224 Courts
thus can, should and do look to international law to interpret a statute that incorporates
treaty obligations. 225

the entire Supreme Court now accepts a textualist approach to statutory interpretation: “The
real divide is over how a Court that unanimously agrees on the priority of text-focused
interpretation sees its own role in relation to Congress’s written plans.”). The Court has
generally not taken anything more than “guidance” from international sources of law to
understand the underlying provisions of the Convention or to interpret the INA’s asylum or
withholding of removal provisions. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999)
(holding that the “[t]he U.N. Handbook may be a useful interpretative aid, but it is not
binding on the Attorney General, the BIA, or United States courts”).
216
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449.
217
6 U.S. 64 (1804).
218
Id. at 118.
219
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
220
6 U.S. at 118.
221
Federal-Mogul Corp v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
222
Id.
223
SNR Roulements v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1341–42 (Ct. Intl. Trade2004).
224
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council 509 U.S. 155, 178 (1993) (acknowledging that a treaty
obligation could provide the “controlling rule of law” over a narrower statutory provision).
See also F. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 (2004) (assumes
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations, citing, inter alia,
Charming Betsy).
225
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. at 164–65.
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The Supreme Court did just that not long ago in Abbott v. Abbott, 226 a case involving a U.S.
statute that incorporated the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction. 227 The Court unabashedly looked to interpretations of the Hague Convention’s
requirements in order to interpret the U.S. statute. It appealed to ordinary principles of
treaty interpretation and considered the text of the Convention, the views of the U.S. State
Department on the meaning of the Convention, decisions of sister signatory states, and the
purposes of the Convention. 228 Though there was an incorporating statute, the Court spent
the first six pages of its legal analysis interpreting the Convention rather than the statute. 229
And while it gave “great weight” to the Department of State’s interpretation, it was the
Department’s interpretation of the Convention, not of the statute, that the Court considered. 230
The Court also looked to international consensus on the meaning of certain aspects of the
Convention that developed after the Convention was drafted, relying on materials from
scholars, international meetings, articles and books. 231 And it interpreted the Convention in
light of its stated purpose of preventing the wrongful removal of children across
international borders. 232
In the same way, courts should look to international and comparative law as authoritative
sources in interpreting language imported into the INA from the Refugee Convention, as did
Justice Stevens in Cardoza-Fonseca and analogous to what the Court did in Abbott. 233 This
would require a recalibration of the way courts and the BIA have treated such sources in
much of the Refugee Act jurisprudence, in which they have often been willing to bat down
guidance or interpretations from non-U.S. sources as “non-binding” without engaging them

560 U.S. 1 (2010).
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), currently codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 9001(originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (1988), incorporating the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980.
228
560 U.S. at 9–10, 15–20.
229
Id. at 8–13.
230
Id. at 15.
231
Id. at 18–19.
232
Id. at 11.
233
See Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 391, 417 (2013). Ambiguities remaining in the Convention-based language
represent unresolved details passed along from the international instrument itself, and the
international community is the proper locus of an ongoing interpretive, adjudicative process
to flesh out the meaning of the Convention’s provisions. As national and international
bodies around the world interpret the Convention’s language, they build a body of authority
on the proper meaning of the Convention. It is fair to assume that Congress intended that
the Refugee Act would ensure compliance with the international obligations of the U.S.
under the Convention on an ongoing basis and in conformity with evolving international
understandings of the Convention’s demands.
226
227
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substantively. 234 Asylum decisions makers would need to treat as persuasive the guidance of
international bodies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and decisions of regional human rights bodies such as the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, as well
as the interpretations of those obligations as incorporated into the domestic law of sister
signatory states. 235 Finally, just as the Supreme Court did in Abbott, adjudicators would have
to look to the terms, purpose, and history of the underlying Convention for guidance on
interpreting its provisions and, by extension, the INA provisions enacted to incorporate it. 236
For Chevron purposes, this analysis is a Step One enterprise undertaken by a court—ordinary
statutory construction in light of congressional intent and employing the Charming Betsy
canon of statutory interpretation. It is for the court to undertake with no obligation of
deference to any agency interpretation. This interpretive context could be contrasted with
the interpretation of other undefined or ambiguous terms in the INA, such as “good moral
character” or “extreme hardship.” 237 These (non-Convention-based) terms are, in fact, the
product of congressional policy decisions in a more ordinary sense, and are more properly
the subject of deference to what Kanstroom calls the agency’s “general interpretive
discretion.” 238 In contrast, here, where the terms derive from an external instrument with
which Congress signaled its intention to comply, ordinary statutory interpretation weighs in
favor of giving courts primary responsibility for construing those terms and of having them
consult directly with sources related to that external instrument. This is what the Court did
in Cardoza-Fonseca, where the process of statutory construction resolved an apparent
ambiguity in the statute. 239
See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); N-A-I-, 27 I. & N. 72, 80 n.4
(B.I.A. 2017) (“The UNHCR’s opinion is not binding on us or controlling as to our
construction of the Act”).
235
See, e.g., Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16–18, citing decisions from the English High Court of Justice,
the Supreme Court of Israel, The Supreme Court of Austria, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the Canadian Supreme Court
and appellate courts in Australia, Scotland and France. Fatma Marouf, in The Role of Foreign
Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, demonstrates such a review of international and
comparative sources, canvassing sources on the question of what constitutes a “particular
social group” under the Refugee Convention. Marouf, supra note 233, at 425–45.
236
See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 20. The BIA recently engaged in precisely this type of analysis in
its long-awaited Negusie decision on the duress exception to the asylum persecutor bar.
Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (BIA 2018). Unfortunately, Attorney General Sessions stayed
that decision and certified it for Attorney General review, which remains pending as of this
moment. 27 I&N Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018).
237
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), § 1182(h).
238
Kanstroom, supra note 119, at 761.
239
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (“The question whether Congress
intended the two standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the
courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded
that Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical”).
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As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has engaged in similar pre-Chevron analysis to discern
congressional intent in other (non-Refugee Act) INA provisions. One example is the case of
INS v. St. Cyr in 2001, where the Court applied statutory construction principles regarding
retroactivity and lenity to resolve the question of whether a recent change in the INA should
be applied retroactively: “Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive
application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, there is, for
Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve.” 240 Because the
“normal tools of statutory construction” resolved the question, the Court declined the
Justice Department’s invitation to accord Chevron deference to the agency’s retroactive
application of the new provision. 241
Another, slightly different way of conceptualizing the dynamics created by statutes
incorporating international obligations is proposed by Thomas Merrill, who suggests that
courts should consider international law obligations in a Chevron “Step Zero” analysis in
which courts would exercise independent judgment from an agency. 242 This would be
analogous to the way that courts consider preliminary questions of constitutionality or
preemption before considering the agency’s views. 243 Such an approach would acknowledge
the growing importance of international human rights instruments as an authoritative legal
framework in the last 50 years 244 and would accord them interpretive primacy as the “law of
the land” analogous to the Constitution under the Supremacy Clause. 245 This pre-Chevron
consideration would befit the nature of a framework rooted in fundamental and universal
human rights, which operates explicitly as a check on sovereign national powers, usually in
the form of the nation’s executive power. The human rights framework operates precisely
by not deferring to a nation’s potentially self-serving interpretations of its own obligations,
consistent with a Step Zero Chevron analysis, and it would be in keeping with both Chevron’s
concern for a structural balance of governmental powers and with a Step One Charming Betsy
analysis.
In sum, at Chevron’s Step One, courts are required to make a rigorous effort to interpret a
statute before engaging any claim of executive deference. The ordinary canons of statutory
interpretation require courts to interpret the INA’s asylum and withholding provisions to
implement the intent of Congress (to comply with the external obligations of the Refugee
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45, 323 (2001) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994), in striking down the BIA’s retroactive application of the
elimination of the commonly used Section 212(c) waiver for individuals who had resolved
criminal cases with the assumption that the waiver would be available to them).
241
Id. at 320 n.45.
242
Merrill, Step Zero, supra note 88, at 785.
243
Id. at 785 n.189.
244
See, e.g., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa & Martha F. Davis eds., 2009).
245
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Henkin, supra note 190, at 886 (“International law is the
law of the land”).
240
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Convention) and to avoid conflict with the Convention under Charming Betsy. Courts should
engage in this analysis directly and without deference to the BIA or the Attorney General, to
determine “what the law is.” 246 And to the extent that international and comparative law
sources can clarify the meaning of statutory terms or phrases that derive from the
Convention—like “persecution,” “well-founded fear” and “particular social group”—courts
should look to and rely on those sources. This Chevron Step One (or, arguably, Step Zero)
analysis is the province of the courts, which should delve into it without deference to any
executive interpretation. 247
VI.

Conclusion

The last thirty years have seen an evolution of the rhetoric around and the way people think
about immigration in the United States. Political candidates and successive administrations
alike have transformed the complex dynamics of human migration—the constellation of
such push and pull factors as family, opportunity, physical danger, political movements,
poverty, economic markets, natural disasters, social dynamics and personal initiative—into a
simplistic question of law and order. “What part of ‘illegal’ don’t you understand?”
Immigration—specifically immigration enforcement—has become one of the most potent
political issues of the day, wielded often by politicians who have no deep experience with the
realities of immigration or the communities most affected by it, but who recognize the
power the issue has to mobilize political support by defining a clear “us” in opposition to a
clear “them.” Anyone in unlawful immigration status is deemed to be irredeemably a
“lawbreaker.” The immigration agencies, under intense political pressure and with the
justification that they are “restoring law and order”, focus on combating fraud and on
detaining, expelling or removing anyone who is out of lawful immigration status. Under the
past three administrations, this has even included dedication of considerable Justice
Department resources to the actual criminal prosecution of tens of thousands of
unauthorized border crossers, culminating in the Trump administration’s “zero tolerance”
commitment to criminally prosecute every unauthorized crosser.
With regard to refugee protection specifically, this criminalization of immigration has
highlighted longstanding dilemmas inherent in a system that entrusts humanitarian
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that it is the “duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding
that Chevron gives the Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to “say what the law is”)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
247
This article has focused on reasons that deference to the Justice Department is not
appropriate in refugee determination cases as a general matter. In the case of a specific
Justice Department decision on some aspect of asylum or withholding law, there may also be
challenges to the reasonableness of the decision even under a Chevron Step Two analysis. See,
e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (declining to defer under Chevron Step
Two, finding the agency failed to operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation).
Many of the Courts of Appeals that declined to defer to Matter of Silva-Trevino did so on
grounds that the Attorney General’s interpretation was unreasonable. See supra note 148.
246
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protection to the very agencies charged with the hyper-politicized task of enforcing border
control. The dilemmas arise because border entry laws are not the totality of our immigration law.
The INA requires the protection of vulnerable refugees just as much as it prohibits unlawful
entry. We need the same kind of rigor in enforcing the treaty-based obligation to protect as
we see in enforcing entry restrictions; that obligation is equally part of a “lawful”
immigration system. If anything, asylum and withholding provisions are less open to
executive interpretation as a constitutional matter than other parts of the INA, because they
reflect treaty obligations, which are—indisputably when they have been incorporated into a
federal statute—the “supreme law of the land.” And yet the executive agencies have few
political incentives to rigorously enforce the protection of these vulnerable people, who have
no vote and little influence in the political system. To the contrary, agencies and
administrations have very powerful incentives to run roughshod over this protection, to reap
the benefit of public perceptions of strong border control.
The Chevron Court’s fundamental concern was for the proper balance of powers between the
branches of government. Since 1984, the Court has recognized that executive deference
does not automatically extend to every agency on every type of question. Where there are
reasons to doubt that Congress would have intended to give an agency unchecked power
over a particular question, the Court has recognized the important judicial role of rigorous
review. And on the question of humanitarian protection under the Refugee Act, there are
indeed a number of reasons to believe that Congress did not intend to delegate unchecked
interpretive power to the immigration enforcement agencies.
First, there is reason to believe that Congress would not have entrusted unchecked authority
over the protection of the fundamental human rights of vulnerable and politically powerless
migrants to the very enforcement agencies charged with combating irregular migration. The
Immigration Court system is located firmly within the Department of Justice, one of the
principal immigration enforcement agencies, and it is under the direct institutional control of
the Attorney General, the nation’s chief law enforcement officer—and a politically
appointed Cabinet member closely tied to the President. The Attorney General has both the
power and the political incentives to shortchange asylum seekers in favor of border control.
Attorney General Sessions’ recent decision in Matter of A-B- is a clear attempt to cut off
asylum protection—as that has been recognized through the regular adjudicatory process of
the Board, no less—for survivors of domestic violence and gang related violence. Sessions
articulated a priority of limiting access to the asylum process and tied this priority explicitly
to the political mandate he saw President Trump as having received in the election—to shut
down irregular migration at the border.
I do not intend with this argument to question the good faith of many of the individual
attorneys, judges and Board Members who work within the Immigration Court system day
after day. Many fight valiantly to ensure due process and a fair application of the law to the
thousands of individuals who appear before them. But it is worth noting that the structure
of their agency contributes to the difficulty of their performing their jobs well rather than
mitigating it. The conflict of interest in asylum cases is not, for the most part, personal—it is
fundamental to the institutional structure of a politicized executive agency. This structural
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conflict is at the heart of the National Association of Immigration Judges’ advocacy for a
truly independent immigration court system.
It is also at the crux of why courts should not defer to the Justice Department on matters of
asylum and withholding. The agency’s principal immigration charge is understood as
enforcing restrictions against irregular migration, and it is therefore unreasonable as a matter
of government structure to believe that Congress would have entrusted unchecked power to
that enforcement agency to interpret the terms of asylum eligibility. And while majoritarian
political accountability is often considered an advantage on true questions of policy, it is a
distinct disadvantage in any attempt to protect the fundamental rights of politically
vulnerable minorities. These are all reason that it is unlikely that Congress would have
assigned unchecked power over such individual protection to the whims of any given
executive’s politicized decisions on immigration enforcement. As such, courts should
decline to exercise Chevron deference on asylum and withholding decisions by the Attorney
General and the BIA.
Furthermore, Congress clearly, affirmatively intended to protect refugees when it passed the
Refugee Act and incorporated the Refugee Convention’s obligations into the INA’s asylum
and withholding of removal provisions. The determination of the content of those
obligations, as reflected in statute, is a process of legal interpretation that belongs to the
courts under Marbury v. Madison, the Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation, and
Chevron Step One. It is thus the courts’ responsibility under the Constitution to determine
what the law of asylum is, that is, how Congress intended to define the word “refugee” when
it imported that definition from the Refugee Convention. The essentially “law-like” nature
of this interpretive exercise, together with the lack of expertise within the BIA on the
interpretation of international and comparative law, supports this preference for the courts
to do this interpretation. And the fact that the obligations arise from such an authoritative
external source means that they are not negotiable “policy” questions on which the political
branches might be free to impose their preferences.
Full enforcement of the law requires full enforcement of provisions that grant protection as
well as provisions that restrict border entry. This is the part of “enforcement” that the
Department of Justice is not equipped to fully understand. The agency’s fundamental
commitment to controlling unauthorized immigration does not allow it a neutral, open
position on asylum questions. The foundational separation and balance of powers concerns
at the heart of Chevron require courts to recognize that inherent conflict of interest as a
reason Congress is unlikely to have delegated unchecked power on refugee protection to the
prosecuting agency. In our constitutional structure, the courts stand as an essential check on
the executive power to deport and must provide robust review to fully enforce the
congressional mandate to protect refugees. If the courts abdicate this vital function, they
will be abdicating their distinctive role in ensuring the full enforcement of all of our
immigration law—including those provisions that seek to ensure compliance with our
international obligations to protect individuals facing the danger of persecution.
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